Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Chemistry

Author(s):  
Joseph E. Earley
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 177
Author(s):  
Joachim Schummer

<span>If you expect a Nobel prize winner being a crank who can think of nothing but his subject, then read Roald Hoffmann's The Sume and Not the Sameand test your hypothesis. This book is about chemistry, to be sure-but in the broadest scope including sociology, psychology, ethics and philosophy of chemistry.</span>


Author(s):  
Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 223-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rein Vihalemm

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 185-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariana Córdoba ◽  
Alfio Zambon

Author(s):  
Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino

The conclusion recapitulates the thesis that has been defended in the book, reiterating the relevance of Boyle’s chemical philosophy for current debates in the philosophy of chemistry. The concluding remarks proceed to articulate the way in which Boyle’s emergentist conception of chemical qualities anticipates many of the positions currently taken by philosophers of chemistry, particularly with regard to the emergence and supervenience of chemical properties, epistemic and explanatory reductionism, and the autonomy of chemical explanations and of chemistry as a scientific discipline.


Author(s):  
Roald Hoffmann

Implicit in the title might be two presumptions. The first one, that there is (or should be) a single philosophy of science, is not a claim I intend—I do think one should look for a common core, in a way that allows for differences. The second presumption, that philosophy of science, as it is construed today, would be different if it were based on chemistry, is what I wish to examine. And behind that latter supposition is the notion that philosophers of science, their professionalism and good will not impugned, nevertheless are likely to construct their worldview of science based on the sciences they know best. These are usually the sciences that they studied (a) as a part of their general education, or (b) the science they came from, so to speak, if they made their transition to philosophy at some later point in their career. I have not made a rigorous examination of the education of philosophers of science. But my anecdotal feeling is that, for those who entered the profession directly, an exposure to mathematical logic is more likely than to geology or chemistry. And, for many of the philosophers of science who came to their field after an initial scientific career, their scientific expertise was likely to be in the first instance physics, after that biology, and rarely chemistry. I will argue that this matters, for chemistry is different. There are exceptions. In the English-writing community, the most striking one is Michael Polanyi, a very distinguished physical chemist. In the French philosophical community, Pierre Duhem, Emile Meyerson, Gaston Bachelard, and Hélène Metzger had professional chemical backgrounds. Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent has argued convincingly that this background shaped their philosophical outlook, in contrast with the analytic philosophers of their time. In recent times the situation may have changed. A subfield of “philosophy of chemistry” has emerged, with annual meetings and two journals (Foundations of Chemistry, Hyle). The practitioners of this field are more likely to have had substantive experience in chemistry.


Author(s):  
Hinne Hettema

This contribution addresses Hempel’s well-known “The Theoretician’s Dilemma” from the viewpoint of philosophy of chemistry. While from the viewpoint of mainstream philosophy of science it might appear that the issues raised by this paper, published in 1958, are well settled, philosophy of chemistry has the potential to reopen the debate on theoretical terms in an interesting way. In this contribution I will reopen the debate and approach the problem of theoretical terms in a fashion which may be instructive to the wider philosophy of science. In “The Theoretician’s Dilemma” the argument hinges on the purpose of theoretical terms. Theoretical terms either serve their purpose (that is, they form part of a deductive chain that establishes definite connections between observables), or they don’t. Hempel then mounts an argument to show that if theoretical terms serve their purpose, they can be dispensed with. On the other hand, of course, if the theoretical terms don’t serve their purpose, they should be dispensed with. Hence the dilemma shows that theoretical terms are unnecessary. Hempel’s way out of the dilemma is to attack its premise. Hempel argues that theoretical terms do more than just establish a convenient shorthand to describe observations. Theoretical terms, argues Hempel, serve an ontological function in addition to theoretical systematization. Theoretical terms pick out some essential feature of nature such that they allow theories to “track truth” (in the words of Psillos 1999). From the viewpoint of philosophy of chemistry, the issue is this. Chemical theories frequently refer to entities, such as “atoms,” “chemical elements,” “electrons,” and “orbitals” that have some counterpart of the same name in theories of physics. Such chemical theories, as per the quote from Nagel above, are generally formulated with great care, as are their counterparts in physics. Yet is also the case that the use of such terms in the theories of chemistry is in many cases inconsistent with how these same terms are conceived in physics.


Metascience ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-459
Author(s):  
Steven French

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