Board Committees

2021 ◽  
pp. 967-1004
Author(s):  
Francesco de Zwart
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
David A. Carter ◽  
Frank P. D'Souza ◽  
Betty J. Simkins ◽  
W. Gary Simpson

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (10) ◽  
pp. 1073-1092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irina Berezinets ◽  
Yulia Ilina ◽  
Anna Cherkasskaya

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the link between board structure and performance of public companies in Russia – an emerging market with unique institutional background and a variability of corporate governance (CG) practices across its companies. Design/methodology/approach Panel data analysis was applied on a sample of 207 Russian companies that frequently traded in the Russian Trading System during the period 2007-2011, in order to test hypotheses on the relationships between board size, board independence, gender diversity, presence of board committees and financial performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Findings The results show a positive relationship between Tobin’s Q and the board’s gender diversity. The analysis demonstrates that smaller and bigger boards are associated with a greater Tobin’s Q value. Originality/value The findings provide additional evidence of how board structure is related to its effectiveness and corporate performance in countries with concentrated ownership, highly variable CG practices and a lack of proper implementation of corporate law and governance codes. The paper contributes to the existing empirical evidence on the advantages of small and large-sized boards and on gender diversity, and is the first investigating the relationship between Russian companies’ board committees and market-based performance. The results regarding board independence and committees suggest that these mechanisms are still not widely recognized for their role in CG and company performance in Russia.


Author(s):  
Danuse Bement ◽  
Ryan Krause

Boards of directors are governing bodies that reside at the apex of the modern corporation. Boards monitor the behavior of firm management, provide managers access to knowledge, expertise, and external networks, and serve as advisors and sounding boards for the CEO. Board attributes such as board size and independence, director demographics, and firm ownership have all been studied as antecedents of effective board functioning and, ultimately, firm performance. Steady progress has been made toward understanding how boards influence firm outcomes, but several key questions about board leadership structure remain unresolved. Research on board leadership structure encompasses the study of board chairs, lead independent directors, and board committees. Board chair research indicates that when held by competent individuals, this key leadership position has the potential to contribute to efficient board functioning and firm performance. Researchers have found conflicting evidence regarding CEO duality, the practice of the CEO also serving as the board chair. The effect of this phenomenon—once ubiquitous among U.S. boards—ranges widely based on circumstances such as board independence, CEO power, and/or environmental conditions. Progressively, however, potential negative consequences of CEO duality proposed by agency theory appear to be counterbalanced by other governance mechanisms and regulatory changes. A popular mechanism for a compromise between the benefits of CEO duality and independent monitoring is to establish the role of a lead independent director. Although research on this role is in its early stage, results suggest that when implemented properly, the lead independent director can aid board monitoring without adding confusion to a unified chain of command. Board oversight committees, another key board leadership mechanism, improve directors’ access to information, enhance decision-making quality by allowing directors to focus on specialized topics outside of board meetings, and increase the speed of response to critical matters. Future research on the governance roles of boards, leadership configurations, and board committees is likely to explore theories beyond agency and resource dependence, as well as rely less on collecting archival data and more on finding creative ways to access rarely examined board interactions, such as board and committee meetings and executive sessions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-64
Author(s):  
Victor Onuorah Dike ◽  
Joseph Kwadwo Tuffour

The lingering poor financial performance by banks and bank failure in the past three decades, despite various regulatory actions, has led to a debate on the efficacy of the various regulatory actions and the effectiveness of the practices of corporate governance in Nigerian banks (CBN, 2014; Berger, Imbierowicz, & Rauch, 2016). The study seeks to understand how corporate governance practices influence banks’ performance. The qualitative approach purposively selected three banks and three board interview respondents. Using thematic analysis, the results show that, large board size is not sufficient to improve performance but the broader expertise and other resources the directors bring are the critical elements. The study finds consensus that, outsider directors were desirable, as they provide additional expertise, and assist in making strategic input to improve management decisions. Enhanced monitoring and oversight responsibilities and access to information of board committees improve board effectiveness with favourable effects on bank performance. While the moderating effect of female representation with other governance characteristics on bank performance is subject to the female complementary expertise and their proportion of the board, that of foreign directors appear to be negligible. Bank boards are recommended to be of the right caliber and quantity with adequate resources to offer enhanced monitoring and oversight responsibilities


Author(s):  
Brenda Hannigan

This chapter discusses corporate governance in publicly traded companies with widely dispersed shareholdings. Most shareholders are not involved in the management and control of a company's affairs. Thus, a separation usually develops between those who collectively own the company through their combined shareholdings (the shareholders) and those who manage it (the directors). Problems can arise from this separation of ownership and control as distance from the day-to-day running of the business makes it difficult for shareholders to restrain any managerial excesses. The starting point of good corporate governance is internal mechanisms (such as shareholders' rights and board structures). The discussions cover the UK corporate governance code, corporate governance requirement, board committees, and shareholder engagement.


Author(s):  
Kalin D. Kolev ◽  
David B. Wangrow ◽  
Vincent L. Barker ◽  
Donald J. Schepker

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document