Informational uniqueness of closed-loop Nash equilibria for a class of nonstandard dynamic games

1985 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 409-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Başar
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Closed Loop

scholarly journals Dinamicke igre ulaska na trziste

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (165) ◽  
pp. 121-144
Author(s):  
Bozo Stojanovic
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Reasonable Solution ◽  
Multiple Nash Equilibria ◽  
Entry Games

Market processes can be analyzed by means of dynamic games. In a number of dynamic games multiple Nash equilibria appear. These equilibria often involve no credible threats the implementation of which is not in the interests of the players making them. The concept of sub game perfect equilibrium rules out these situations by stating that a reasonable solution to a game cannot involve players believing and acting upon noncredible threats or promises. A simple way of finding the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game is by using the principle of backward induction. To explain how this equilibrium concept is applied, we analyze the dynamic entry games.

scholarly journals Open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria in constrained linear–quadratic dynamic games played over event trees

Automatica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 162-174
Author(s):  
Puduru Viswanadha Reddy ◽  
Georges Zaccour
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
Linear Quadratic ◽  
Feedback Nash Equilibria ◽  
Event Trees

scholarly journals Two-Player Location Game in a Closed-Loop Market with Quantity Competition

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Chen ◽  
Qiankun Song ◽  
Zhenjiang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Minimum Distance ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Transportation Cost ◽  
Competitive Dynamics ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Local Market ◽  
Induction Method ◽  
Quantity Competition ◽  
Circle Model

This paper considers the two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition. Based on the Cournot and Hotelling models, a circle model is established for a closed-loop market in which two players (firms) play a location game under quantity competition. Using a two-stage (location-then-quantity) pattern and backward induction method, the existence of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria is proved for the location game in the circle model with a minimum distance transportation cost function. In addition, sales strategies are proposed for the two players for every local market on the circle when the players are in the equilibrium positions. Finally, an algorithm for simulating the competitive dynamics of the closed-loop market is designed, and two numerical simulations are provided to substantiate the effectiveness of the obtained results.

scholarly journals Capuchin monkeys ( Sapajus [ Cebus ] apella ) play Nash equilibria in dynamic games, but their decisions are likely not influenced by oxytocin

2019 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. e22973 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mackenzie F. Smith ◽  
Kelly L. Leverett ◽  
Bart J. Wilson ◽  
Sarah F. Brosnan
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Cebus Apella ◽  
Capuchin Monkeys

Nash equilibria in risk-sensitive dynamic games

2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 1397-1401 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.B. Klompstra
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Risk Sensitive

scholarly journals Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information

2015 ◽  
Vol 243 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 147-177 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria

scholarly journals Genetic neural networks to approximate feedback nash equilibria in dynamic games

2003 ◽  
Vol 46 (10-11) ◽  
pp. 1493-1509 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Sirakaya ◽  
N.M. Alemdar
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Feedback Nash Equilibria
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document