Constitutional privacy

1994 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffery L. Johnson

Author(s):  
Dov Fox

A recent survey of half of all U.S. fertility clinics found that more than one in five misdiagnosed, mislabeled, or mishandled reproductive materials. These errors can’t be chalked up to reasonable slips of hand or lapses in judgment as often as deficient quality controls; and no statute or doctrine vindicates these injuries, or says they matter as a matter of law. Victims can’t point to any physical or financial harm they’ve suffered. Some courts point out that reproductive plans are easy to invent and hard to verify. Others wonder why plaintiffs whose plans were thwarted didn’t just turn to abortion or adoption instead. And most are unwilling to cast a child’s birth as a legal injury. The American legal system treats confounded procreation less like mischief than misfortune, closer to a star-crossed romance or a losing ticket in the natural lottery—the kind of adversity that, however fateful, you have no choice but to steel yourself against and move on from: You can’t always get what you want. This indifference is surprising in a country that’s constitutionalized rights to abortion and birth control since the 1960s and 1970s. But even this “fundamental rights” status hasn’t kept states from aggressively restricting access to abortion and contraception, and the Court hasn’t extended these reproductive freedoms to practices that introduce donors or surrogates into the mix. Besides, constitutional privacy applies only to misconduct by government actors: It offers no protection against wrongdoing by any nonstate clinic, pharmacy, or hospital.



1991 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-356
Author(s):  
Robert N. Roberts ◽  
Marion T. Doss


1994 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
Jeffery L. Johnson


2020 ◽  
pp. 67-83
Author(s):  
Cynthia A. Merrill


2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (9999) ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Melinda A. Roberts ◽  


1992 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 609-650 ◽  
Author(s):  
T Goltmakor

The emergence of organized political groups of people with AIDS has forced issues of health and illness into a public visibility which threatens traditional assumptions of privacy and public heterosexual privilege. The struggle against the stigmatization of AIDS has forced many gay men and lesbians to reject the relative pleasures of the closet and its legal girdings in discredited notions of constitutional privacy for a radical insistence on the right to be ‘queer’ on their own terms in public. ACT UP and Queer Nation present a threat not only to prevailing state and church ideologies of power and submission, but perhaps more importantly to the gendered and sexualized assumptions which define the boundaries of public space itself. People who are ill and people defined as degenerates present a special threat to the historical myths and antiurban morphology of Los Angeles, which still is perceived as an island of private consumption and public piety by those in power. The challenge presented by ACT UP and Queer Nation is an integral part of the spatial densification of the region, feared by old Anglo and new Catholic authorities.



1980 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-171
Author(s):  
Jonathan Brant ◽  
John Graceffa

Abstract The Chad Green case has again focused national and international attention on the unproven cancer remedy known as laetrile. Laetrile has attracted considerable attention in recent years as a result of claims that it is a nontoxic form of cancer treatment. Twenty-one states have legalized prescription of laetrile within their borders, despite the efforts of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to keep laetrile off the market. The authors examine the claims about laetrile’s effectiveness and comment upon scientific tests concerning its efficacy. They maintain that scientific support for the use of laetrile is almost totally absent and that evidence of the dangers of laetrile is substantial. After reviewing the medical evidence concerning laetrile, the authors describe the efforts of laetrile proponents to use the courts as the battleground to legalize laetrile. In early skirmishes, laetrile proponents were successful in opposing the efforts of the FDA; under a constitutional privacy theory several courts upheld the right of competent adults to select laetrile therapy. Subsequently, however, as the authors demonstrate, the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Rutherford, and the California Supreme Court, in People v. Privitera, narrowed the federal constitutional privacy right by declining to read into it a right to take laetrile. Finally, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in the Chad Green case, considered the question of laetrile’s toxicity to a recipient of the drug. The authors discuss the interrelationship among the three cases. They argue that the overwhelming proof in Chad Green that laetrile is harmful undermines any statutory or constitutional claims supporting legalization, because such claims assume that even if laetrile is not truly therapeutic outside of the placebo effect, it is not toxic. In light of the three decisions, the authors conclude that supporters of laetrile should not expect that the courts will be sympathetic to future legal efforts to approve or to permit use of laetrile therapy.



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