The European exchange rate mechanism and the European monetary union

De Economist ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 144 (2) ◽  
pp. 305-324
Author(s):  
Franz Palm
2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Aspinwall

This article examines British preferences on European monetary integration. It challenges dominant theories of preference formation, suggesting an alternative explanation focusing on governmental majority. Empirical evidence is presented on both UK economic behaviour and the views of domestic economic interests, as well as government majority. The article also analyses first and second-hand accounts of the main players involved in three cases: the decision not to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979, the decision to join the ERM in 1990, and the decision to opt out of stage 3 of Economic and Monetary Union.


Author(s):  
Ulla Neergaard

From the very beginning, an essential cornerstone of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II). It has been in force since 1 January 1999, ie from the initiation of the third phase of the EMU. Its overall purpose is to link currencies of Member States outside the euro area to the euro. Its importance lies in the fact that aspiring Member States must first join the mechanism for at least two years before being admitted as members of the euro area, as ERM II ‘membership’ is one of the four convergence criteria, which are required to be fulfilled for a Member State’s eventual adoption of the euro.


2002 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 359-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETER AYKENS

The concept of authority has recently received heightened attention in the international politics literature. Unfortunately, considerable confusion still exists regarding who possesses authority, how authority is constituted, how it erodes and how it differs from other means of generating compliance, most notably power. Drawing on work from international political economy and political theory, this article sets out to clarify some of the many ambiguities surrounding authority. It builds hypotheses regarding state/market authority relations and tests these hypotheses in the context of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1992–93. The article concludes that the ERM crisis did not represent a mere ‘bump in the road’ on the way to European Monetary Union, but rather the break-up of policy consensus in a dramatic way.


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