Can Recurrent Neural Networks Predict Inflation in Euro Zone as Good as Professional Forecasters?

This paper investigates whether a specific type of a recurrent neural network, in particular Jordan neural network (JNN), captures the expected inflation better than commonly used feedforward neural networks and traditional parametric time-series models. It also considers competing survey-based and model-based expected inflation towards ex-post actual inflation to find whose predictions are more accurate; predictions from survey respondents or forecasting modelers. Further, it proposes neural network modelling strategy when dealing with nonstationary time-series which exhibit long-memory property and nonlinear dependence with respect to lagged inputs and exogenous inputs as well. Following this strategy, overfitting problem was reduced until no improvement in forecasting accuracy of expected inflation is achieved. The main finding is that JNN predicts inflation in euro zone quite accurately within forecasting horizon of 2 years. Regarding rational expectation principle we have found a set of demand-pull and cost-push inflation characteristics as exogenous inputs which helps in reducing overfitting problem of recurrent neural network even more. The sample includes euro zone aggregated monthly observations from January 2000 to December 2019. The results also confirm that inflation expectations obtained from JNN are consistent with Survey of professional forecasters (SPF), and thus, monetary policy makers can use JNN as a complementary tool in shortcomings of other inflation expectations measures.

Inflation puzzles, the Phillips Curve and output expectations: new perspectives from the Euro Zone

Confidence in the Phillips Curve (PC) as predictor of inflation developments along the business cycle has been shaken by recent “inflation puzzles” in advanced countries, such as the “missing disinflation” in the aftermath of the Great Recession and the “missing inflation” in the years of recovery, to which the Euro-Zone “excess deflation” during the post-crisis depression may be added. This paper proposes a newly specified Phillips Curve model, in which expected inflation, instead of being treated as an exogenous explanatory variable of actual inflation, is endogenized. The idea is simply that if the PC is used to foresee inflation, then its expectational component should in some way be the result of agents using the PC itself. As a consequence, the truly independent explanatory variables of inflation turn out to be the output gaps and the related forecast errors by agents, with notable empirical consequences. The model is tested with the Euro-Zone data 1999–2019 showing that it may provide a consistent explanation of the “inflation puzzles” by disentangling the structural component from the expectational effects of the PC.

The Economy of the Border Municipalities of Finland in the Post-Crisis Years

The 2008–2009 crisis and the subsequent euro zone crisis dealt a serious blow to the Finnish economy. 2009 was marked by a significant reduction in the country's GDP, an increase in unemployment, and an increase in public debt. In the following years, Finland did not experience stable economic growth, and in 2014, mutual sanctions between Russia and the EU made their contribution. It was only in 2016 that the country began its systematic return to its pre-crisis state. Finnish municipalities bordering Russia since the 1990’s. the twentieth century is the least economically developed part of the country, which at the same time is most closely connected with our country due to its geographical location. In this regard, in this article, the author considered the economic situation of these municipalities on the basis of available official statistics. It was found that the dynamics of the considered indicators most often correlate with what was happening in the country as a whole. In 2014–2015, no special negative consequences from counter-sanctions on the part of our country were revealed. The exception was the indicators related to the service sector of border municipalities, which in 2014–2015 were noticeably worse than the average for Finland.

Monetary Policy within a COVID-19 Environment: The Role of Central Banks and the Main Challenges for the Euro-zone

The last financial crisis in 2008 has weakened the Euro-zone countries. Most of them were deeply affected, and their economic growths have not returned to their pre-crisis rates. Moreover, the inflation rate is still very low despite the European Central Bank’s interventions. Twelve years later, a health crisis occurred. The ECB have reacted to this event by using monetary tools. We can cite for example the famous temporary Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) to save the Euro-zone countries from a systemic disaster. The current interest rate is negative, and it seems to raise some questions about the efficiency of policies and the threat to economic, monetary, and financial stability. Negative interest rate may also generate the next crisis. This paper is dedicated to recommendations based on the role of Central Banks in the health crisis management and, more generally, environmental crisis management instead of evaluating the impacts of the monetary policies on Eurozone countries because it is too early to measure with acuity the COVID-19 effects.

HYPERINFLATION IN THE EURO AREA?

In the non-academic sector in Germany, it is often advocated that the expansion of the ECB’s money supply would inevitably lead to high inflation or even hyperinflation. This paper explores the question of whether inflation could arise in the euro zone, if so how high it would be and whether it would be hyperinflation. The work is based on theoretical considerations on the subject of hyperinflation and inflation and outlines a possible scenario in which the latter could actually become a reality. The thesis is that the greatest danger to the euro zone would come if Italy and / or Spain chose to leave the Union. Covid-19 has increased the risk of divergent economic developments in different countries in the euro zone. Italy and Spain have to reckon with a dramatic increase in public debt, weak growth and deteriorating conditions on the labour market. The main risk is unlikely to be that the euro zone will not help Italy or Spain, but the people in these countries may feel that aid is not enough, thus making an exit a serious option. If these countries left the Eurozone, then they would likely opt for an orderly exit. That means Italy would join EMS II after a one-time devaluation and not leave the EU. If the exit was not negotiated, then a disorderly parting would commence, which is the scenario with a high risk of hyperinflation.

Political Union? Some Critical Reflections

This conference brings together an impressive number of eminent politicians, outstanding representatives from business, public administration and academia. Notwithstanding nuances there seems to be a broad consensus that the crisis has demonstrated not only that we need more Europe, but also —having read many contributions— how this «more Europe» should be realized. Bearing in mind the atrocities of two World Wars, the separa-tion of Europe by the iron curtain, the challenge stemming from globalisation and a rapidly changing world who would not support the project of a strong and prosperous Europe to guarantee peace in this sphere and to assert, if not enhance its position in the world. However, agreement on the goal does not necessarily imply agreement on the way and the tools by which this end can be achieved. While the positions presented at this conference and at many other occasions have been straightforward and firm, my position is much more cautious. I will, in fact, mainly raise a number of questions. «If the Euro fails, Europe will fail», is Chancellor Merkel’s dictum. I am critical on this. The Euro, not to mention Europe is not at stake. What is at stake is the euro zone, and by that I mean the composition of the euro zone rather than the euro zone itself. A popular argument is that the crisis confronts «Europe» —or rather EMU— with two alternatives. Either political integration is strengthened with the «finalité» of political union or monetary union is doomed to collapse.

PUBLIC DEBT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN EURO AREA COUNTRIES. A WAVELET APPROACH

In this paper we propose to analyze the dynamic of the relation between public debt and economic growth rate for Euro area countries by employing a wavelet approach, establishing thus both short-term and long-term correlations between these two variables. In this way we will present time-frequency dependencies between debt and economic growth and differentiate between short term and long-term effects. High levels of public debt have a negative impact on the economic output, because they entail concerns about debt sustainability. Non-linear analysis of the debt-growth nexus shows the existence of thresholds from which rising indebtedness can hamper economic growth. Using wavelet analysis, we demonstrate that there is a strong relation between public debt and economic growth, especially for high frequencies, public debt having a significant impact on economic growth in case of periods situated above 2 years for most Euro Zone member states. High debt levels can cause serious effects on fiscal stability and therefore require fiscal consolidation in order to restore economic growth. Therefore, Euro Zone member states should implement prudent debt policies and establish clear limits for debt increase, in order to comply with fiscal sustainability and ensure conditions for preserving economic growth.

Stakeholder Value Creation: Comparing ESG and Value Added in European Companies

In recent years, a renewed interest in value creation for stakeholders has been witnessed in different contexts. Different tools have been proposed to try to grasp and measure such value(s) but, in many cases, the main perspective remains that of the shareholders. To contribute to the field of research that aims to discuss novel ways of thinking about value creation measurement, this paper addresses the relationship between ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) ratings and Value Added, as proxies of value creation and distribution for stakeholders. In particular, we consider whether ESG ratings are able to capture companies that are characterized by their capacity for generating higher Value Added for stakeholders. Our analysis uses the frontier methodology combined with means comparison. Data from 2018 were downloaded from EIKON, for all companies within the Euro zone and for all sectors (1932 companies, of which 399 held an ESG rating, compared with 1533 without ESG analysis). Our analysis reveals that, although ESG is theoretically considered a good social responsibility proxy, ESG indices cannot be used as an indicator of value creation for stakeholders but, rather, must be considered as only one of the components. This implies a need to review the limitations of ESG ratings and establish that the relevant indices are not suitable for use in universal or absolute decision-making.