Let$\mathbf{f}$and$\mathbf{g}$be polynomials of a bounded Euclidean norm in the ring$\mathbb{Z}[X]/\langle X^{n}+1\rangle$. Given the polynomial$[\mathbf{f}/\mathbf{g}]_{q}\in \mathbb{Z}_{q}[X]/\langle X^{n}+1\rangle$, the NTRU problem is to find$\mathbf{a},\mathbf{b}\in \mathbb{Z}[X]/\langle X^{n}+1\rangle$with a small Euclidean norm such that$[\mathbf{a}/\mathbf{b}]_{q}=[\mathbf{f}/\mathbf{g}]_{q}$. We propose an algorithm to solve the NTRU problem, which runs in$2^{O(\log ^{2}\unicode[STIX]{x1D706})}$time when$\Vert \mathbf{g}\Vert ,\Vert \mathbf{f}\Vert$, and$\Vert \mathbf{g}^{-1}\Vert$are within some range. The main technique of our algorithm is the reduction of a problem on a field to one on a subfield. The GGH scheme, the first candidate of an (approximate) multilinear map, was recently found to be insecure by the Hu–Jia attack using low-level encodings of zero, but no polynomial-time attack was known without them. In the GGH scheme without low-level encodings of zero, our algorithm can be directly applied to attack this scheme if we have some top-level encodings of zero and a known pair of plaintext and ciphertext. Using our algorithm, we can construct a level-$0$encoding of zero and utilize it to attack a security ground of this scheme in the quasi-polynomial time of its security parameter using the parameters suggested by Garg, Gentry and Halevi [‘Candidate multilinear maps from ideal lattices’,Advances in cryptology — EUROCRYPT 2013(Springer, 2013) 1–17].
Autonomous geometric precision error estimation in low-level computer vision tasks