Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 573-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fan-Chin Kung
Keyword(s):  
Size Effect ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Local Public Goods ◽  
Group Size Effect

scholarly journals Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasuyuki Sawada ◽  
Ryuji Kasahara ◽  
Keitaro Aoyagi ◽  
Masahiro Shoji ◽  
Mika Ueyama
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Size Effect ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Field Experiments ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Individual Contribution ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Group Size Effect

In a canonical model of collective action, individual contribution to collective action is negatively correlated with group size. Yet, empirical evidence on the group size effect has been mixed, partly due to heterogeneities in group activities. In this paper, we first construct a simple model of collective action with the free rider problem, altruism, public goods, and positive externalities of social networks. We then empirically test the theoretical implications of the group size effect on individual contribution to four different types of collective action, i.e., monetary or nonmonetary contribution to directly or indirectly productive activities. To achieve this, we collect and employ artefactual field experimental data such as public goods and dictator games conducted in southern Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where the majority of farmers were relocated to randomly selected communities based on the government lottery. This unique situation enables us to identify the causal effects of community size on collective action. We find that the levels of collective action can be explained by the social preferences of farmers. We also show evidence of free riding by self-interested households with no landholdings. The pattern of collective action, however, differs significantly by mode of activity—collective action that is directly rather than indirectly related to production is less likely to suffer from the free rider problem. Also, monetary contribution is less likely to cause free riding than nonmonetary labor contribution. Unlike labor contributions, monetary contributions involve collection of fees which can be easily tracked and verified, possibly leading to better enforcement of collective action.

Non-monotonic group-size effect in repeated provision of public goods

2016 ◽  
Vol 89 ◽  
pp. 116-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengsi Wang ◽  
Galina Zudenkova
Keyword(s):  
Size Effect ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Group Size Effect

scholarly journals Group size effect in nutmeg mannikin: between-individuals behavioral differences but same plasticity

2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 684-689 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Rieucau ◽  
J. Morand-Ferron ◽  
L.-A. Giraldeau
Keyword(s):  
Size Effect ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Behavioral Differences ◽  
Group Size Effect

scholarly journals Group Size Effect on Cooperation in One-Shot Social Dilemmas II: Curvilinear Effect

PLoS ONE ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. e0131419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerio Capraro ◽  
Hélène Barcelo
Keyword(s):  
Size Effect ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Group Size Effect ◽  
Curvilinear Effect
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