Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games: characterization and existence

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 685-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haifeng Fu ◽  
Ying Xu ◽  
Luyi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Large Games

scholarly journals Nash Equilibria in Large Games

Game Theory ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dionysius Glycopantis
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
General Setting ◽  
Large Games ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Infinite Game ◽  
Anonymous Game

This paper adds to the discussion, in a general setting, that given a Nash-Schmeidler (nonanonymous) game it is not always possible to define a Mas-Colell (anonymous) game. In the two games, the players have different strategic behaviours and the formulations of the two problems are different. Also, we offer a novel explanation for the lack of a Nash equilibrium in an infinite game. We consider this game as the limit of a sequence of approximate, finite games for which an equilibrium exists. However, the limiting pure strategy function is not measurable.

scholarly journals Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Bruno Yun ◽  
Srdjan Vesic ◽  
Nir Oren
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Normal Form Games

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

EFFICIENCY WAGES WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450007
Author(s):  
BRANDON LEHR
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Heterogeneous Agents ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Efficiency Wages

This paper builds a model of efficiency wages with heterogeneous workers in the economy who differ with respect to their disutility of labor effort. In such an economy, two types of pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibria in firm wage offers can exist: a no-shirking equilibrium in which all workers exert effort while employed and a shirking equilibrium in which within each firm some workers exert effort while others shirk. The type of equilibrium that prevails in the economy depends crucially on the extent of heterogeneity among the workers and the equilibrium rate at which workers join firms from the unemployment pool.

Finding all pure strategy Nash equilibria in a planar location game

2011 ◽  
Vol 214 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.M. Díaz-Báñez ◽  
M. Heredia ◽  
B. Pelegrín ◽  
P. Pérez-Lantero ◽  
I. Ventura
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Planar Location
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