On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games

This paper adds to the discussion, in a general setting, that given a Nash-Schmeidler (nonanonymous) game it is not always possible to define a Mas-Colell (anonymous) game. In the two games, the players have different strategic behaviours and the formulations of the two problems are different. Also, we offer a novel explanation for the lack of a Nash equilibrium in an infinite game. We consider this game as the limit of a sequence of approximate, finite games for which an equilibrium exists. However, the limiting pure strategy function is not measurable.

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Representing pure Nash equilibria in argumentation

Argument & Computation ◽

10.3233/aac-210007 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-14

Author(s):

Bruno Yun ◽

Srdjan Vesic ◽

Nir Oren

Keyword(s):

Normal Form ◽

Nash Equilibria ◽

Pure Strategy ◽

Normal Form Games

In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.

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Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Games

Operations Research Proceedings - Operations Research Proceedings 2006 ◽

10.1007/978-3-540-69995-8_7 ◽

2007 ◽

pp. 45-51

Author(s):

Juliane Dunke

Keyword(s):

Cooperative Games ◽

Nash Equilibria ◽

Pure Strategy ◽

Non Cooperative Games

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The Limit Distribution of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games

Mathematics of Operations Research ◽

10.1287/moor.21.3.726 ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 21 (3) ◽

pp. 726-733 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

William Stanford

Keyword(s):

Limit Distribution ◽

Nash Equilibria ◽

Pure Strategy ◽

Bimatrix Games

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EFFICIENCY WAGES WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS

International Game Theory Review ◽

10.1142/s0219198914500078 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 16 (03) ◽

pp. 1450007

Author(s):

BRANDON LEHR

Keyword(s):

Nash Equilibria ◽

Heterogeneous Agents ◽

Pure Strategy ◽

Efficiency Wages

This paper builds a model of efficiency wages with heterogeneous workers in the economy who differ with respect to their disutility of labor effort. In such an economy, two types of pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibria in firm wage offers can exist: a no-shirking equilibrium in which all workers exert effort while employed and a shirking equilibrium in which within each firm some workers exert effort while others shirk. The type of equilibrium that prevails in the economy depends crucially on the extent of heterogeneity among the workers and the equilibrium rate at which workers join firms from the unemployment pool.

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