scholarly journals Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen Kuipers ◽  
János Flesch ◽  
Gijs Schoenmakers ◽  
Koos Vrieze
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Subgame Perfection ◽  
Information Games

scholarly journals Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state

2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 205-237 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Kuipers ◽  
J. Flesch ◽  
G. Schoenmakers ◽  
K. Vrieze
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Subgame Perfection ◽  
Information Games

scholarly journals The simple geometry of perfect information games

2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Demichelis ◽  
Klaus Ritzberger ◽  
Jeroen M. Swinkels
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Simple Geometry ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

scholarly journals A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Bhaskar ◽  
George J. Mailath ◽  
Stephen Edward Morris
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Markov Equilibria ◽  
Information Games

Branching Time, Perfect Information Games, and Backward Induction

2001 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giacomo Bonanno
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Branching Time ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

scholarly journals BELIEF REVISION IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION

2004 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Clausing
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Belief Condition ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Use Of Knowledge ◽  
Information Games

A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use of knowledge instead of belief are also studied within this framework.

scholarly journals Best-Response Cycles in Perfect Information Games

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-433
Author(s):  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Arkadi Predtetchinski
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games

scholarly journals Best Response Cycles in Perfect Information Games

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings ◽  
Arkadi Predtetchinski
Keyword(s):  
Perfect Information ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Perfect Information Games ◽  
Information Games
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