scholarly journals Convergence of the Aumann?Davis?Maschler and Geanakoplos bargaining sets

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Sets

scholarly journals On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (04) ◽  
pp. 1550008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bezalel Peleg ◽  
Peter Sudhölter
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Set ◽  
Ntu Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Ntu Game ◽  
Bargaining Sets

We show that the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.

scholarly journals The least core, kernel and bargaining sets of large games

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-601 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezra Einy ◽  
Dov Monderer ◽  
Diego Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Large Games ◽  
Least Core ◽  
Bargaining Sets

On the core, nucleolus and bargaining sets of cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 6129-6142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xia Zhang ◽  
Hao Sun ◽  
Genjiu Xu ◽  
Dongshuang Hou
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Bargaining Sets

A Perspective-Invariant Approach to Nash Bargaining

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Nalebuff
Keyword(s):  
Business Strategy ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Disagreement Point ◽  
Equal Sacrifice ◽  
Symmetry Axiom ◽  
Bargaining Sets ◽  
Invariant Approach ◽  
Do So

The Nash axioms lead to different results depending on whether the negotiation is framed in terms of gains relative to no agreement or in terms of sacrifices relative to an ideal. We look for a solution that leads to the same result from both perspectives. To do so, we restrict the application of Nash’s IIA axiom to bargaining sets where all options are individually rational and none exceed either party’s ideal point. If we normalize the bargaining set so that the disagreement point is (0, 0) and maximal gains are (1, 1), then any perspective-invariant bargaining solution must lie between the Utilitarian solution and the maximal equal-gain (minimal equal-sacrifice) solution. We show that a modified version of Nash’s symmetry axiom leads to the Utilitarian solution and that a reciprocity axiom leads to the equal-gain (equal-sacrifice) solution, both of which are perspective invariant. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, Business Strategy.

scholarly journals Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets

Econometrica ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 65 (5) ◽  
pp. 1227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Anderson ◽  
Walter Trockel ◽  
Lin Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Sets
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