The core of social choice problems with monotone preferences and a feasibility constraint

2004 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Meirowitz
Author(s):  
Norman Schofield

A key concept of social choice is the idea of the Condorcet point or core. For example, consider a voting game with four participants so any three will win. If voters have Euclidean preferences, then the point at the center will be unbeaten. Earlier spatial models of social choice focused on deterministic voter choice. However, it is clear that voter choice is intrinsically stochastic. This chapter employs a stochastic model based on multinomial logit to examine whether parties in electoral competition tend to converge toward the electoral center or respond to activist pressure to adopt more polarized policies. The chapter discusses experimental results of the idea of the core explores empirical analyses of elections in Israel and the United States.


1997 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graciela Chichilnisky
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 1340012 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATHIEU MARTIN ◽  
MAURICE SALLES

We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.


2006 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 1114-1136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Mandler

By taking sets of utility functions as primitive, we define an ordering over assumptions on utility functions that gauges their measurement requirements. Cardinal and ordinal assumptions constitute two levels of measurability, but other assumptions lie between these extremes. We apply the ordering to explanations of why preferences should be convex. The assumption that utility is concave qualifies as a compromise between cardinality and ordinality, while the Arrow-Koopmans explanation, supposedly an ordinal theory, relies on utilities in the cardinal measurement class. In social choice theory, a concavity compromise between ordinality and cardinality is also possible and rationalizes the core utilitarian policies.


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