SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 1340012 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATHIEU MARTIN ◽  
MAURICE SALLES
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Topological Structure ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
The Core ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Voting Games ◽  
Aggregation Functions ◽  
Positive Results

We consider voting games as procedures to aggregate individual preferences. We survey positive results on the nonemptiness of the core of voting games and explore other solutions concepts that are basic supersets of the core such as Rubinstein's stability set and two types of uncovered sets. We consider cases where the sets of alternatives are 'ordinary' sets, finite sets and infinite sets with possibly a topological structure.

scholarly journals Collusive Behavior of Bidders in English Auctions: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Takayuki Oishi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Single Object ◽  
English Auctions ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
The Core ◽  
Game Theoretic

In practice, collusive bidders' rings in English auctions with a single object frequently distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of re-auctions called knockouts. The present paper introduces a model of sequences of knockouts under the situation in which each bidder has information on his evaluation and the order of the evaluations of all bidders for the object. The present paper examines the distributive function of sequences of knockouts from the viewpoint of cooperative game theory. Each sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core, two particular sequences yielding the Shapley value and the nucleolus respectively. The present paper highlights the sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus.

scholarly journals Cooperative Game Theory and its Insurance Applications

1991 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Lemaire
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Characteristic Function ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Elementary Level ◽  
Stable Sets ◽  
Survey Paper ◽  
The Core ◽  
Basic Concepts

AbstractThis survey paper presents the basic concepts of cooperative game theory, at an elementary level. Five examples, including three insurance applications, are progressively developed throughout the paper. The characteristic function, the core, the stable sets, the Shapley value, the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are defined and computed for the different examples.

scholarly journals Is There an Optimal Strategic Oil Reserve for Each Country? A Study Based on the Game Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-72
Author(s):  
Junan Yang ◽  
Rong-Gang Cong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Coalition Game ◽  
Oil Reserves ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Core Solution

In generally, there is a phenomenon of “free rider” in the establishment of national oil reserves for different countries, which means that they have the tendency of underestimating the strategic oil reserves. This paper attempts to explain this phenomenon from the perspective of non-cooperative game theory. It also analyzes the establishment of strategic oil reserve among different countries based on the coalition game theory and presents the core solution for it. The results show that based on a certain constraint mechanism, it is feasible for different countries to establish their own suitable strategic oil reserves in theory and practice.

APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY TO ECONOMICS

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 1340011 ◽  
Author(s):  
GUILLERMO OWEN
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
The Core ◽  
The Shapley Value

We look at the basic applications of cooperative game theory to economic situations. These include bargaining and cooperative equilibria, especially as the number of players increases without bound. The core and the Shapley value are the fundamental tools for these applications. We consider the relation between these two concepts. A comprehensive bibliography of work published over the last decade is included.

Grid Cyber-Physical System Risk Management Model Based on Cooperative Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cunbin Li ◽  
Ding Liu ◽  
Yi Wang ◽  
Chunyan Liang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Physical System ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Power Grid ◽  
Management Model ◽  
Cyber Physical System ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Generation Power

AbstractAdvanced grid technology represented by smart grid and energy internet is the core feature of the next-generation power grid. The next-generation power grid will be a large-scale cyber-physical system (CPS), which will have a higher level of risk management due to its flexibility in sensing and control. This paper explains the methods and results of a study on grid CPS’s behavior after risk. Firstly, a behavior model based on hybrid automata is built to simulate grid CPS’s risk decisions. Then, a GCPS risk transfer model based on cooperative game theory is built. The model allows decisions to ignore complex network structures. On this basis, a modified applicant-proposing algorithm to achieve risk optimum is proposed. The risk management model proposed in this paper can provide references for power generation and transmission decision after risk as well as risk aversion, an empirical study in north China verifies its validity.

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