scholarly journals Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain

2003 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Semih Koray ◽  
Bulent Unel
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions

scholarly journals A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 711-733 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shurojit Chatterji ◽  
Arunava Sen ◽  
Huaxia Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions

scholarly journals A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods

1994 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Barber� ◽  
Matthew Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Strategy Proof

scholarly journals Functional Form of Nonmanipulable Social Choice Functions with Two Alternatives

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (21) ◽  
pp. 2827
Author(s):  
Anna De Simone ◽  
Ciro Tarantino
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Functional Form ◽  
Social Choice Function ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
The Family ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Universal Domain ◽  
Infinite Set ◽  
Class Of Functions

We propose a new functional form characterization of binary nonmanipulable social choice functions on a universal domain and an arbitrary, possibly infinite, set of agents. In order to achieve this, we considered the more general case of two-valued social choice functions and describe the structure of the family consisting of groups of agents having no power to determine the values of a nonmanipulable social choice function. With the help of such a structure, we introduce a class of functions that we call powerless revealing social choice functions and show that the binary nonmanipulable social choice functions are the powerless revealing ones.

Full Implementation under Ambiguity

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-178
Author(s):  
Huiyi Guo ◽  
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Maxmin Expected Utility ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Bayesian Implementation ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
Choice Set

This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value. (JEL D71, D81, D82)

A comparative analysis of social choice functions, IV

1981 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 346-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey T. Richelson
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions

scholarly journals Self-selective social choice functions

2007 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Semih Koray ◽  
Arkadii Slinko
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions
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