scholarly journals On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions

2021 ◽  
pp. 102593
Author(s):  
Souvik Roy ◽  
Soumyarup Sadhukhan
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Strategy Proofness

In Praise of Manipulation

2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
KEITH DOWDING ◽  
MARTIN VAN HEES
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Voting Procedures ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the ‘sincerity argument’, according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the ‘transparency’ argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.

scholarly journals Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1195-1220
Author(s):  
Ujjwal Kumar ◽  
Souvik Roy ◽  
Arunava Sen ◽  
Sonal Yadav ◽  
Huaxia Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Function ◽  
Social Choice Function ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Local Strategy ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
True Type ◽  
Strategy Proof ◽  
Voting Models ◽  
Strategy Proofness

The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. The type graph for a voter is a graph whose vertices are the possible types of the voter. Two vertices are connected by an edge in the graph if the associated types are “neighbors.” A social choice function is locally strategy‐proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresentation to a type that is a neighbor of her true type. A social choice function is strategy‐proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresentation to an arbitrary type. Local‐global equivalence (LGE) is satisfied if local strategy‐proofness implies strategy‐proofness. The paper identifies a condition on the graph that characterizes LGE. Our notion of “localness” is perfectly general. We use this feature of our model to identify notions of localness according to which various models of multidimensional voting satisfy LGE. Finally, we show that LGE for deterministic social choice functions does not imply LGE for random social choice functions.

Full Implementation under Ambiguity

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-178
Author(s):  
Huiyi Guo ◽  
Nicholas C. Yannelis
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Maxmin Expected Utility ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Bayesian Implementation ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
Choice Set

This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value. (JEL D71, D81, D82)

A comparative analysis of social choice functions, IV

1981 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 346-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey T. Richelson
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions

scholarly journals Self-selective social choice functions

2007 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Semih Koray ◽  
Arkadii Slinko
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions
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