The hidden side of intentional action: the role of the anterior insular cortex

2010 ◽  
Vol 214 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 603-610 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcel Brass ◽  
Patrick Haggard
2014 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 264-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tianwen Chen ◽  
Lars Michels ◽  
Kaustubh Supekar ◽  
John Kochalka ◽  
Srikanth Ryali ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
You-Ping Yang ◽  
Xinjian Li ◽  
Veit Stuphorn

AbstractIn humans, risk attitude is highly context-dependent, varying with wealth levels or for different potential outcomes, such as gains or losses. These behavioral effects are well described by Prospect Theory, with the key assumption that humans represent the value of each available option asymmetrically as gain or loss relative to a reference point. However, it remains unknown how these computations are implemented at the neuronal level. Using a new token gambling task, we found that macaques, like humans, change their risk attitude across wealth levels and gain/loss contexts. Neurons in their anterior insular cortex (AIC) encode the ‘reference point’ (i.e. the current wealth level of the monkey) and the ‘asymmetric value function’ (i.e. option value signals are more sensitive to change in the loss than in the gain context) as postulated by Prospect Theory. In addition, changes in the activity of a subgroup of AIC neurons are correlated with the inter-trial fluctuations in choice and risk attitude. Taken together, we find that the role of primate AIC in risky decision-making is to monitor contextual information used to guide the animal’s willingness to accept risk.


2009 ◽  
Vol 450 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasunori Kotani ◽  
Yoshimi Ohgami ◽  
Yumiko Kuramoto ◽  
Tetsuji Tsukamoto ◽  
Yusuke Inoue ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (10) ◽  
pp. 1131-1145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takahiko Koike ◽  
Hiroki C Tanabe ◽  
Saori Adachi-Abe ◽  
Shuntaro Okazaki ◽  
Eri Nakagawa ◽  
...  

Abstract Understanding others as intentional agents is critical in social interactions. We perceive others’ intentions through identification, a categorical judgment that others should work like oneself. The most primitive form of understanding others’ intentions is joint attention (JA). During JA, an initiator selects a shared object through gaze (initiative joint attention, IJA), and the responder follows the direction of the initiator’s gaze (reactive joint attention, RJA). Therefore, both participants share the intention of object selection. However, the neural underpinning of shared intention through JA remains unknown. In this study, we hypothesized that JA is represented by inter-individual neural synchronization of the intention-related activity. Additionally, JA requires eye contact that activates the limbic mirror system; therefore, we hypothesized that this system is involved in shared attention through JA. To test these hypotheses, participants underwent hyperscanning fMRI while performing JA tasks. We found that IJA-related activation of the right anterior insular cortex of participants was positively correlated with RJA-related activation of homologous regions in their partners. This area was activated by volitional selection of the target during IJA. Therefore, identification with others by JA is likely accomplished by the shared intentionality of target selection represented by inter-individual synchronization of the right anterior insular cortex.


2010 ◽  
Vol 214 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 579-591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Lamm ◽  
Tania Singer

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 (9) ◽  
pp. S5
Author(s):  
Marco Venniro ◽  
Daniele Caprioli ◽  
Michelle Zhang ◽  
Leslie Whitaker ◽  
Shiling Zhang ◽  
...  

2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 560-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hélène Catenoix ◽  
Jean Isnard ◽  
Marc Guénot ◽  
Jérome Petit ◽  
Claude Remy ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
A. D. (Bud) Craig

This chapter describes evidence that the anterior insular cortex (AIC) is activated during thoughts, and explains how cognitive feelings are generated in the model of interoceptive and homeostatic integration. Presenting evidence that the AIC engenders subjective awareness and feelings about time, the chapter also shows how a cinemascopic structure in the model of interoceptive feelings can produce awareness across time, as well as musical feelings and subjectivity. It argues that the key functional role of the AIC in humans is the control of network activity in the brain, then relates this concept to studies that suggest a major role of the AIC in fluid intelligence and in behavioral guidance based on energy utilization.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document