Neural correlates of product attachment to cosmetics

The neurobiological basis of brand and product attachment has received much attention in consumer neuroscience research, although it remains unclear. In this study, we conducted functional MRI experiments involving female users of famous luxury brand cosmetics as participants, based on the regions of interest involved in human attachment and object attachment. The results showed that the left ventral pallidum (VP), which is involved in positive reward, and the right posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), which is involved in self-concept, a key concept in object attachment, are the core regions in cosmetic attachment. Moreover, the performed psychophysiological interaction analyses showed that VP-temporoparietal junction connectivity positively correlated with activity in the dorsal raphe nucleus, and PCC–anterior hippocampus (aHC) connectivity positively correlated with subjective evaluation of attachment. The former suggests that object attachment is a human-like attachment and a stronger tendency of anthropomorphism is associated with stronger feelings of security. The latter suggests that the individual’s concept of attachment as well as the relationships with the attached cosmetics are represented in the aHC, and the PCC–aHC associations produce subjective awareness of the attachment relationships. These associations between memory and reward systems have been shown to play critical roles in cosmetic attachment.

EXPRESS: The role of perceptual and cognitive load on inattentional blindness: a systematic review and three meta-analyses

The inattentional blindness phenomenon refers to situations where a visible but unexpected stimulus remains consciously unnoticed by observers. This phenomenon is classically explained as the consequence of insufficient attention, because attentional resources are already engaged elsewhere or vary between individuals. However, this attentional-resources view is broad and often imprecise regarding the variety of attentional models, the different pools of resources that can be involved in attentional tasks and the heterogeneity of the experimental paradigms. Our aim was to investigate whether a classic theoretical model of attention, namely the Load Theory, could account for a large range of empirical findings in this field by distinguishing the role of perceptual and cognitive resources in attentional selection and attentional capture by irrelevant stimuli. Since this model has been mostly built on implicit measures of distractor interference, it is unclear whether its predictions also hold when explicit and subjective awareness of an unexpected stimulus is concerned. Therefore, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analyses of inattentional blindness studies investigating the role of perceptual and/or cognitive resources. The results reveal that, in line with the perceptual account of the Load Theory, inattentional blindness significantly increases with the perceptual load of the task. However, the cognitive account of this theory is not clearly supported by the empirical findings analyzed here. Furthermore, the interaction between perceptual and cognitive load on inattentional blindness remains understudied. Theoretical implications for the Load Theory are discussed, notably regarding the difference between attentional capture and subjective awareness paradigms, and further research directions are provided.

Facilitating Adaptive Emotion Processing and Somatic Reappraisal via Sustained Mindful Interoceptive Attention

Emotions are by nature embodied, as the brain has evolved to quickly assess the emotional significance of stimuli and output signals to the body’s viscera and periphery to aid adaptive responses. Emotions involve both implicit bodily and explicit narrative processes, and patients may experience transdiagnostic distress when bodily signals are not attended to and holistically integrated with explicit narratives about experience. Similarly, therapists may be trained in more implicit body-based approaches (i.e., massage/bodywork, physical and occupational therapy, and nursing/medicine) or more explicit narrative-based approaches (i.e., psychotherapy), and may lack training in skills that integrate both levels of emotion processing to aid healing and growth. To address these gaps, we propose a framework where the bridge between implicit bodily sensations and explicit narratives lies in cultivating mindful awareness of bodily sensations associated with emotions. This process brings subjective awareness to notice inner body experience (or interoceptive awareness) that is often outside of conscious awareness, so that it may be understood and re-integrated in more adaptive ways, which we call somatic reappraisal. Using clinical theory and example vignettes, we present mindful interoceptive awareness for adaptive emotion processing as a framework to cultivate and enhance somatic reappraisal. Mindful interoceptive awareness brings more focused and sustained attention to inner body experience; likewise, internal sensations associated with emotions become more granular, vivid, and can shift in ways that facilitate somatic reappraisal. Learning to sustain interoceptive awareness when engaged with mindfulness qualities of nonjudgment and compassion promotes an experience where new associations between emotions, meanings, and memories can be made that generate insights that are holistic and integrative. A clinical vignette is used in this paper to provide examples of this approach in psychotherapy. An example script for use in mindfulness groups is included, and resources are suggested for clinicians to gain more experience. Mindful interoceptive awareness for adaptive emotion processing is a clinical process that can be learned and applied by a range of clinicians to treat mental and physical health conditions that may benefit greater embodied awareness.

The Limits to Machine Consciousness

It is generally accepted that machines can replicate cognitive tasks performed by conscious agents as long as they are not based on the capacity of awareness. We consider several views on the nature of subjective awareness, which is fundamental for self-reflection and review, and present reasons why this property is not computable. We argue that consciousness is more than an epiphenomenon and assuming it to be a separate category is consistent with both quantum mechanics and cognitive science. We speak of two kinds of consciousness, little-C and big-C, and discuss the significance of this classification in analyzing the current academic debates in the field. The interaction between the system and the measuring apparatus of the experimenter is examined both from the perspectives of decoherence and the quantum Zeno effect. These ideas are used as context to address the question of limits to machine consciousness.

Visual instrumental learning in blindsight monkeys

Blindsight is the residual visuo-motor ability without subjective awareness observed after lesions of the primary visual cortex (V1). Various visual functions are retained, however, instrumental visual associative learning remains to be investigated. Here we examined the secondary reinforcing properties of visual cues presented to the hemianopic field of macaque monkeys with unilateral V1 lesions. Our aim was to test the potential role of visual pathways bypassing V1 in reinforcing visual instrumental learning. When learning the location of a hidden area in an oculomotor search task, conditioned visual cues presented to the lesion-affected hemifield operated as an effective secondary reinforcer. We noted that not only the hidden area location, but also the vector of the saccade entering the target area was reinforced. Importantly, when the visual reinforcement signal was presented in the lesion-affected field, the monkeys continued searching, as opposed to stopping when the cue was presented in the intact field. This suggests the monkeys were less confident that the target location had been discovered when the reinforcement cue was presented in the affected field. These results indicate that the visual signals mediated by the residual visual pathways after V1 lesions can access fundamental reinforcement mechanisms but with impaired visual awareness.

Giving Up on Consciousness as the Ghost in the Machine

Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being aware of our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories (psychological contents) including the intimate experience of a unified self with the capacity to generate and control actions and psychological contents. This compelling, intuitive consciousness-centric account has, and continues to shape folk and scientific accounts of psychology and human behavior. Over the last 30 years, research from the cognitive neurosciences has challenged this intuitive social construct account when providing a neurocognitive architecture for a human psychology. Growing evidence suggests that the executive functions typically attributed to the experience of consciousness are carried out competently, backstage and outside subjective awareness by a myriad of fast, efficient non-conscious brain systems. While it remains unclear how and where the experience of consciousness is generated in the brain, we suggested that the traditional intuitive explanation that consciousness is causally efficacious is wrong-headed when providing a cognitive neuroscientific account of human psychology. Notwithstanding the compelling 1st-person experience (inside view) that convinces us that subjective awareness is the mental curator of our actions and thoughts, we argue that the best framework for building a scientific account is to be consistent with the biophysical causal dependency of prior neural processes. From a 3rd person perspective, (outside view), we propose that subjective awareness lacking causal influence, is (no more) than our experience of being aware, our awareness of our psychological content, knowing that we are aware, and the belief that that such experiences are evidence of an agentive capacity shared by others. While the human mind can be described as comprising both conscious and nonconscious aspects, both ultimately depend on neural process in the brain. In arguing for the counter-intuitive epiphenomenal perspective, we suggest that a scientific approach considers all mental aspects of mind including consciousness in terms of their underlying, preceding (causal) biological changes, in the realization that most brain processes are not accompanied by any discernible change in subjective awareness.

Detecting Vulnerability in Source Code Using CNN and LSTM Network

Vulnerabilities can have very serious consequences for information security, with huge implications for economic, social, and even national security. Automated vulnerability detection has always been a keen topic for researchers. From traditional manual vulnerability mining to static detection and dynamic detection, all rely on human experts to define features. The rapid development of machine learning and deep learning has alleviated the tedious task of manually defining features by human experts while reducing the lack of objectivity caused by human subjective awareness. However, we still need to find an objective characterization method to define the features of vulnerabilities. Therefore, we use code metrics for code characterization, which are sequences of metrics that represent code. To use code metrics for vulnerability detection, we propose VulnExplore, a deep learning-based vulnerability detection model that uses a composite neural network of CNN + LSTM for feature extraction and learning of code metrics. Experimental results show that VulnExplore has a lower false positive rate, a lower miss rate, and a better accuracy rate compared to other deep learning-based vulnerability detection models.

Modelling aspects of consciousness: a topological perspective

Attention Schema Theory (AST) is a recent proposal to provide a scientific explanation for the basis of subjective awareness. Essentially, AST posits that conscious experience in the minds of humans and some other animals is the result of evolution having provided the mind with its own internal model of attention taking place within their own (and others') mind (the 'attention schema'). However, the inability of humans to understand how their own subjective awareness arises (related to the so-called 'hard problem' of consciousness) is because the attention schema is inherently incomplete. In this short note, we ask to what extent it is possible, in principle, for a mind (either human or machine-based) to have an attention schema that is complete in the sense of being able to faithfully represent streams of attention. Using a simple model and a mathematical argument based on classical topology, we describe some limits of the extent to which an attention schema could be complete.