scholarly journals Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade

2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Burani ◽  
Clara Ponsati
2004 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Mortimer

The licensing of provincial surgeons and physicians in the post-Restoration period has proved an awkward subject for medical historians. It has divided writers between those who regard the possession of a local licence as a mark of professionalism or proficiency, those who see the existence of diocesan licences as a mark of an essentially unregulated and decentralized trade, and those who discount the distinction of licensing in assessing medical expertise availability in a given region. Such a diversity of interpretations has meant that the very descriptors by which practitioners were known to their contemporaries (and are referred to by historians) have become fragmented and difficult to use without a specific context. As David Harley has pointed out in his study of licensed physicians in the north-west of England, “historians often define eighteenth-century physicians as men with medical degrees, thus ignoring … the many licensed physicians throughout the country”. One could similarly draw attention to the inadequacy of the word “surgeon” to cover licensed and unlicensed practitioners, barber-surgeons, Company members in towns, self-taught practitioners using surgical manuals, and procedural specialists whose work came under the umbrella of surgery, such as bonesetters, midwives and phlebotomists. Although such fragmentation of meaning reflects a diversity of practices carried on under the same occupational descriptors in early modern England, the result is an imprecise historical literature in which the importance of licensing, and especially local licensing, is either ignored as a delimiter or viewed as an inaccurate gauge of medical proficiency.


2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Pitlik

Abstract Due to the incentives of both suppliers and users of policy advice the influence of economists on government decisions is almost negligible. This paper aims to explore the prospects of policy advice addressed to the general public as a countervailing power. It is argued that in order to have some impact on public opinion economists must rely primarily on propaganda and have to overcome a serious collective action problem. Yet, the organization of the academic system provides no incentives for economists to fulfil the role of general-public-oriented advisers.


2006 ◽  
Vol 108 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morten Hviid ◽  
H. Peter Møllgaard

1970 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Macfarlane

Shop stewards, or other forms of workshop representation, are a common feature of British industry. It is not known for certain how many such shop floor representatives are active; estimates vary between 90,000 and 200.000, “the truth is probably somewhere between these two figures”. What is certain, however, is that the great majority of industrial workers, particularly in large-scale industry, have recourse to lay trade union representation for the settlement of shop floor grievances. Often such representatives are “the union” for the ordinary workman who does not come into contact with full-time union officers. “For the great majority of British trade unionists the workplace representative is their only direct personal link with their union.” He also provides a front-line defence against the arbitrary use of authority by management. If no shop steward existed, managerial authority, unchecked by the countervailing power of shop floor representatives, would be open to abuse. If such managerial authority was also supported by a system of legal powers which further strengthened its position, it would make possible “the use of penal sanctions to compel acceptance of working conditions which free agents would not endure”. Such was the case in the British Merchant Navy until less than five years ago.


2018 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katrijn Gielens ◽  
Inge Geyskens ◽  
Barbara Deleersnyder ◽  
Max Nohe

Suppliers are increasingly being forced by dominant retailers to clean up their supply chains. These retailers argue that their sustainability mandates may translate into profits for suppliers, but many suppliers are cynical about these mandates because the onus to undertake the required investments is on them while potential gains may be usurped by the mandating retailer. We examine whether supplier fears are justified by studying the impact of Walmart's sustainability mandate on its suppliers’ (short-term) shareholder value. Although about two-thirds of suppliers are indeed financially harmed, approximately one-third benefit. To delve deeper into this variation, we relate suppliers’ short-term abnormal returns to Walmart's appropriation power and explore whether and to what extent a supplier's referent and expert power sources, derived from its marketing and operational characteristics, respectively, can counteract Walmart's appropriation attempts. We find that the supplier's marketing characteristics (its environmental reputation, brand equity, and advertising) provide it with the countervailing power needed to resist Walmart's appropriation attempts. In contrast, cost-efficient suppliers and suppliers that invest heavily in R&D have more difficulty withstanding Walmart's squeeze attempts.


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