scholarly journals Constructing software countermeasures against instruction manipulation attacks: an approach based on vulnerability evaluation using fault simulator

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junichi Sakamoto ◽  
Shungo Hayashi ◽  
Daisuke Fujimoto ◽  
Tsutomu Matsumoto

AbstractFault injection attacks (FIA), which cause information leakage by injecting intentional faults into the data or operations of devices, are one of the most powerful methods compromising the security of confidential data stored on these devices. Previous studies related to FIA report that attackers can skip instructions running on many devices through many means of fault injection. Most existing anti-FIA countermeasures on software are designed to secure against instruction skip (IS). On the other hand, recent studies report that attackers can use laser fault injection to manipulate instructions running on devices as they want. Although the previous studies have shown that instruction manipulation (IM) could attack the existing countermeasures against IS, no effective countermeasures against IM have been proposed. This paper is the first work tackling this problem, aiming to construct software-based countermeasures against IM faults. Evaluating program vulnerabilities to IM faults is required to consider countermeasures against IM faults. We propose three IM simulation environments for that aim and compare them to reveal their performance difference. GDB (GNU debugger)-based simulator that we newly propose in this paper outperforms the QEMU-based simulator that we presented in AICCSA:1–8, 2020 in advance, in terms of evaluation time at most $$\times$$ × 400 faster. Evaluating a target program using the proposed IM simulators reveals that the IM faults leading to attack successes are classified into four classes. We propose secure coding techniques as countermeasures against IMs of each four classes and show the effectiveness of the countermeasures using the IM simulators.

10.29007/r2sc ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Osnat Keren ◽  
Ilia Polian

Cryptographic hardware primitives must be protected against fault-injection attacks. Security-oriented error-detecting codes provide (probabilistic) guarantees for detection of maliciously injected faults even under assumption of a sophisticated attacker with access to powerful equipment.In this paper, we revisit the earlier finding that error-detection infrastructure may increase the undesired information leakage. We formalize the information leakage from the checker response by means of mutual information. We apply our analysis to the best security-oriented robust codes known today. We prove that the probability of an undetected attack is exponentially smaller than the entropy loss due to information leak from the checker. This means that an attack will be detected far before the attacker will gain significant information. Given a bound for acceptable information leakage (e.g., 0.5 bits of a 128-bit secret key), our analysis allows the designer to easily choose the number of redundant bits required to stay below that bound. The obtained results extend our knowledge about the relationship between detection capabilities of codes and information leakage due to them.


Author(s):  
Henitsoa Rakotomalala ◽  
Xuan Thuy Ngo ◽  
Zakaria Najm ◽  
Jean-Luc Danger ◽  
Sylvain Guilley

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 265-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sho Endo ◽  
Takeshi Sugawara ◽  
Naofumi Homma ◽  
Takafumi Aoki ◽  
Akashi Satoh

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