scholarly journals Transboundary Pollution Control and Competitiveness Concerns in a Two-Country Differential Game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Marsiglio ◽  
Nahid Masoudi
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Transboundary Pollution

scholarly journals A Cooperative Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution between Two Asymmetric Nations

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Sheng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Industrial Pollution ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Infinite Horizon ◽  
Pollution Abatement ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Consistent Solution

Considering the fact that transboundary pollution control calls for the cooperation between interested parties, this paper studies a cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric nations in infinite-horizon level. In this paper, we model two ways of transboundary pollution: one is an accumulative global pollutant with an uncertain evolutionary dynamic and the other is a regional nonaccumulative pollutant. In our model, firms and governments are separated entities and they play a Stackelberg game, while the governments of the two nations can cooperate in pollution reduction. We discuss the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of governments and industrial firms, and it is found that the governments being cooperative in transboundary pollution control will set a higher pollution tax rate and make more pollution abatement effort than when they are noncooperative. Additionally, a payment distribution mechanism that supports the subgame consistent solution is proposed.

scholarly journals Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Zhigang Chen ◽  
Qianyue Meng ◽  
Huichuan Wang ◽  
Rongwei Xu ◽  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Upstream Region ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Ecological Compensation ◽  
Stackelberg Differential Game ◽  
Downstream Region ◽  
Compensation Rate

This paper studies a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation in a river basin and increases the number of pollutants assumed in the model to multiple. Emission and green innovation investment between upstream and downstream regions in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream region provides economic compensation for green innovation investment in the upstream region. The results show that there is an optimal ecological compensation rate, and a Pareto improvement result can be obtained by implementing ecological compensation. Increasing the proportion of ecological compensation can improve the nonvirtuous chain reaction between green innovation investment cost, pollutant transfer rate, and ecological compensation rate. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a joint mechanism composed of the government and the market and formulate a reasonable green innovation subsidy scheme according to the actual situation of the basin, so as to restrict the emergence of this “individual rational” behavior. For river basin areas that can establish a unified management department and organize the implementation of decision-making, the cooperative game is a very effective pollution control decision.

Transboundary pollution control and environmental absorption efficiency management

2018 ◽  
Vol 287 (2) ◽  
pp. 653-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fouad El Ouardighi ◽  
Konstantin Kogan ◽  
Giorgio Gnecco ◽  
Marcello Sanguineti
Keyword(s):  
Pollution Control ◽  
Absorption Efficiency ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Environmental Absorption Efficiency

scholarly journals A Stochastic Differential Game of Transboundary Pollution under Knightian Uncertainty of Stock Dynamics

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chunyan Fu ◽  
Yongxi Yi ◽  
Susu Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Robust Control ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Knightian Uncertainty ◽  
Stochastic Differential Game ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Optimal Output ◽  
Control Framework ◽  
Pollution Accumulation

With the robust control framework of Hansen and Sargent (2001), this paper investigates a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution between two regions under Knightian uncertainty of stock dynamics. Both regions are assumed to play a noncooperative and a cooperative game, and the worst-case pollution accumulation processes for discrete robustness parameters are characterized. Our objective is to identify both regions’ optimal output and emission levels and analyze the effects of the Knightian uncertainty of pollution stock dynamics on both regions’ optimization behavior. We illustrate the results with some numerical examples.

scholarly journals A differential game of international pollution control

1991 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 409-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick van der Ploeg ◽  
Aart de Zeeuw
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control

A differential game of international pollution control with evolving environmental costs

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 680-700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nahid Masoudi ◽  
Georges Zaccour
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Environmental Cost ◽  
Environmental Externalities ◽  
Environmental Costs ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Cooperative Solutions ◽  
Definition Of

AbstractWe consider a two-player differential game of international emissions to represent the interactions between two groups of countries, namely, developed and developing countries. We adopt a broader-than-usual definition of environmental cost for developing countries to account for their evolving involvement in tackling environmental externalities. Cooperative and non-cooperative solutions are characterized and contrasted. We find that it may not be the best course of action to push developing countries to reduce their emissions in the short term, and that cooperation may not create enough dividend, also in the short term, to be implementable.

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