Mechanism Analysis of Applying Blockchain Technology to Forestry Carbon Sink Projects Based on the Differential Game Model

As an important way to reduce emission, forestry carbon sink (FCS) has not been implemented effectively. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the effectiveness and mechanism of applying blockchain technology in FCS projects by utilizing the differential game model. A Stackelberg differential game model between forest farmers and emission-controlled enterprises (ECEs) is developed to analyze the optimal emission reduction efforts and the optimal trajectory of forest farmers and ECEs before and after introducing blockchain technology. It is found that: (1) At the initial stage of the utilization of blockchain technology, if blockchain technology takes a leading role in stabilizing carbon prices, the ECEs prefer to purchase FCS instead of reducing emissions by their own technology. On the contrary, if blockchain technology takes a leading role in stimulating the vitality of the carbon trading market, ECEs tend to use emission abatement technology to meet the carbon quote requirements. (2) In the later stage, the incentive and stabilizing effects of blockchain technology on carbon prices tend to be balanced, and the emission reduction efforts of ECEs are lower than the efforts before applying blockchain technology. (3) The application of blockchain technology increases forest farmers’ willingness to reduce emissions because of its effection of cost reduction and efficiency improvement. Meanwhile, blockchain technology reduces abatement costs by influencing carbon prices. Therefore, blockchain technology improves forest farmers’ emission reduction efforts on the whole.

Advertising Cooperation and Green Technology R&D Strategy in a Platform-Led Stackelberg Game

In this paper, we study a platform-led Stackelberg differential game over an infinite planning period considering an industry with two manufacturers competing in a common platform market. One manufacturer invests in R&D and produces green products, and the other produces nongreen products. Three platform advertising strategies are discussed systematically: the platform supports all advertising expenses for both manufacturers (PB), supports only green advertising expenses (PG), and implements a joint advertising plan (PJ) with the green manufacturer. The results reveal that the equilibrium price, R&D effort, and advertising level of products increase as the current green degree increases, while the green degree shows a monotonic trend over time and finally tends to be a stable value. The results also indicate that, in the three models, the green degree and the profits of all players with the PG strategy are the lowest. Compared with the PB strategy, although the PJ strategy may not maximize the profits of all players, from environmental perspective, the strategy would make the alliance achieve the best environmental performance.

Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

This paper studies a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation in a river basin and increases the number of pollutants assumed in the model to multiple. Emission and green innovation investment between upstream and downstream regions in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream region provides economic compensation for green innovation investment in the upstream region. The results show that there is an optimal ecological compensation rate, and a Pareto improvement result can be obtained by implementing ecological compensation. Increasing the proportion of ecological compensation can improve the nonvirtuous chain reaction between green innovation investment cost, pollutant transfer rate, and ecological compensation rate. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a joint mechanism composed of the government and the market and formulate a reasonable green innovation subsidy scheme according to the actual situation of the basin, so as to restrict the emergence of this “individual rational” behavior. For river basin areas that can establish a unified management department and organize the implementation of decision-making, the cooperative game is a very effective pollution control decision.

Inter-organizational contract control of advertising strategies in the supply chain

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Advertising has a crucial impact on a product's goodwill. To further improve a product's goodwill and make more profit, member firms in the supply chain use various contracts to coordinate the channel. Considering the dynamic effect of advertising, this paper studies a two-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The two members focus on maximizing their profits through advertising and pricing strategies under two types of contracts: the wholesale price contract and the consignment contract. The Stackelberg differential game is introduced, and the optimal advertising effort, wholesale and retail pricing strategies in the two situations are studied. Numerical examples and sensitivity analyses are conducted to explore the models further. The results show that the retailer's revenue proportion and the product's goodwill according to consumers significantly affect the strategies and the contract choice of the partner firms in the supply chain. A proportion of too high or too low revenue may lead to a contract selection conflict between the two partner firms. However, when consumers care more about the product's goodwill, this contract selection conflict can be weakened.</p>