scholarly journals The Liar Without Relativism

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Poppy Mankowitz
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Full Understanding ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox ◽  
Semantic Relativism

AbstractSome in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between the Liar paradox and semantic relativism: the view that the truth values of certain occurrences of sentences depend on the contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi (Erkenntnis 82(4):913–928, 2017) argues that contextualist accounts of the Liar paradox are committed to relativism, and Rudnicki and Łukowski (Synthese 1–20, 2019) propose a new account that they classify as relativist. I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived within theories of natural language shows that neither of the purported connections can be maintained. There is no reason why a solution to the Liar paradox needs to accept relativism.

Revenge, I

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith Simmons
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Kripke’S Theory Of Truth ◽  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox ◽  
Excluded Middle

Chapter 8 is the first of two chapters on the phenomenon of revenge paradoxes, paradoxes which, roughly speaking, are constructed out of the very terms of a purported solution. The chapter begins by exploring the difficulties that revenge presents for Kripke’s theory of truth, in either of two versions: a version that admits truth value gaps, and a paracomplete version which rejects the law of excluded middle. The chapter goes on to critically examine Field’s paracomplete theory of truth and its treatment of revenge, arguing that Field’s theory is couched in terms that are artificial and too far removed from natural language. The chapter concludes with a critical discussion of Priest’s dialetheist approach to the Liar paradox, according to which there are true contradictions. It is argued that Priest’s theory is itself subject to revenge paradoxes.

John Buridan’s Theory of Truth and the Paradox of the Liar

Vivarium ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 184-213
Author(s):  
Ernesto Perini-Santos
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Truth Conditions ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Correct Understanding ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox ◽  
Double Indexing

AbstractThe solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of language. More precisely, there are two important points of the Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory. The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, ‘propositio est vera quia qualitercumque significat in rebus significatis ita est’, once amended, is a correct way to talk about the truth of a sentence. The second one is that he has a double indexing theory of truth: a sentence is true in a time about a time, and such times should be distinguished in the account of the truth-conditions of sentences. These two claims are connected in an important way: the Aristotelian formula indicates the time about which a sentence is true. Some interpreters of the Buridanian solution to the paradox, following the lead of Herzberger, have missed these points and have been led to postulate truth-values gaps, or surrogates of truth-value gaps, when there is nothing of this sort in his theory. I argue against this tradition of interpretation of Buridan and propose an interpretation of his solution to the Liar.

scholarly journals Not Wanted: On Scharp’s Solution to the Liar

Erkenntnis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Pinder
Keyword(s):  
Natural Language ◽  
Alternative Treatment ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Liar Sentence ◽  
Truth Conditional ◽  
Concept Of Truth ◽  
Resultant Theory ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

AbstractKevin Scharp argues that the concept of truth is defective, and is therefore unable to play its intended role in natural language truth-conditional semantics. As such, for this theoretical purpose, Scharp constructs two replacements: ascending truth and descending truth. Scharp applies the resultant theory, AD semantics, to the liar sentence, thereby obtaining a novel solution to the liar paradox. The aim of the present paper is fourfold. First, I show that, contrary to Scharp’s claims, AD semantics in fact yields an inconsistency when applied to standard liar sentences. Second, I diagnose the problem: AD semantics mishandles negation. I propose an alternative treatment, resulting in what I call AD* semantics. Third, I show that AD* semantics gives Scharp the resources required to respond to an alleged revenge paradox that has been raised against his view. Finally, I argue that, these consequences notwithstanding, it remains unclear whether AD* semantics provides an adequate account of alethic paradoxes more generally.

Logic, Language, and the Liar Paradox

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Pleitz
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

Pluralism and the Liar

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory Wright ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Treatment ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

Pluralists maintain that there is more than one truth property in virtue of which bearers are true. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how they diagnose the liar paradox or what resources they have available to treat it. This chapter considers one recent attempt by Cotnoir (2013b) to treat the Liar. It argues that pluralists should reject the version of pluralism that Cotnoir assumes, discourse pluralism, in favor of a more naturalized approach to truth predication in real languages, which should be a desideratum on any successful pluralist conception. Appealing to determination pluralism instead, which focuses on truth properties, it then proposes an alternative treatment to the Liar that shows liar sentences to be undecidable.

Microlanguages, Vagueness, and Paradox

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Dynamic Theory ◽  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Context Sensitivity ◽  
Static Picture ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

This chapter follows recent work in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, which rejects the standard, static picture of languages and highlights its context sensitivity—a dynamic theory of the nature of language. On the view advocated, human languages are things that we build on a conversation-by-conversation basis. The author calls such languages microlanguages. The chapter argues that thinking of languages in terms of microlanguages yields interesting consequences for how we should think about the liar paradox. In particular, we will see that microlanguages have admissible conditions that preclude liar-like sentences. On the view presented in the chapter, liar sentences are not even sentences of any microlanguage that we might construct (or assertorically utter). Accordingly, the proper approach to such a paradoxical sentence is to withhold the sentence—not permitting it to be admitted into our microlanguage unless, or until, certain sharpening occurs.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradley Armour-Garb ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

In this chapter, after introducing a few versions of the liar paradox and identifying the pathology that the versions of the paradox appear to present, the author considers some proposals for how to understand ‘paradox’ and goes on to offer a particular reading of that notion. He then identifies a number of projects the completion of which would contribute to our understanding—or, in some cases, our resolution—of the liar paradox and, after considering certain “treatments” of the paradox, highlights certain “revenge” problems that arise for such treatments. In the concluding section, the author summarizes each of the chapters that are contained in the volume.

A NOTE ON THE LIAR-PARADOX

Mind ◽  
1955 ◽  
Vol LXIV (256) ◽  
pp. 543-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. P. USHENKO
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox

Two Versions of the Liar Paradox

2004 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Tim Maudlin
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
The Liar ◽  
The Liar Paradox
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