Does the Bible Call All Cretans Liars? “The Logical Role of the Liar Paradox in Titus 1:12, 13: A Dissent from the Commentaries in the Light of Philosophical and Logical Analysis” (1994)

2017 ◽  
pp. 217-228
2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-30
Author(s):  
Jc Beall ◽  
Graham Priest

he paper discusses a number of interconnected points concerning negation, truth, validity and the liar paradox. In particular, it discusses an argument for the dialetheic nature of the liar sentence which draws on Dummett’s teleological account of truth. Though one way of formulating this fails, a different way succeeds. The paper then discusses the role of the Principle of Excluded Middle in the argument, and of the thought that truth in a model should be a model of truth.


1994 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony C. Thiselton

AbstractThe proposition Cretans are always liars" is not a socio-contingent proposition about Cretans in Titus 1:12,13. It has nothing to do with stereotyping Cretans, but, placed as it is on the lips of a Cretan speaker, constitutes a purely logical or formal proposition which expresses a paradox. A careful tracing of the functions of logical paradox from Zeno and the other Greeks to modern mathematical logic demonstrates its frequent function as meta-language, to break out of a vicious circularity which may arise from within a single-level system of propositions. In Titus, the context substantiates the view which also emerges from philosophical analysis that paradox may expose a logical asymmetry between first-person utterances of a kind which are necessarily embedded in life through given commitments and third-person utterances which do not entail any given stake in life. The paradox of Titus 1:12 brings into focus the self-defeating and often fruitless escalation of claims in purely verbal exchanges which may be transposed to a constructive level if truth-claims made by the elders or bishops can be perceived as drawing currency from blameless conduct. They are not to be "empty talkers" who "profess to know God but deny him by their deeds" (1:8,10,16). A clumsy confusion arose in Patristic exegesis and thereafter between the logically necessary and logically contingent status of the proposition in Titus 1:12 for reasons which are explained here, including the blurring of two distinct traditions about "Epimenides" of Crete, with whom the paradox of the liar is strongly associated. Counterarguments to this proposal are considered and addressed, including the special function of the postscript "this testimony is true" (Titus 1:13a).


Author(s):  
Cory Wright ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb

Pluralists maintain that there is more than one truth property in virtue of which bearers are true. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear how they diagnose the liar paradox or what resources they have available to treat it. This chapter considers one recent attempt by Cotnoir (2013b) to treat the Liar. It argues that pluralists should reject the version of pluralism that Cotnoir assumes, discourse pluralism, in favor of a more naturalized approach to truth predication in real languages, which should be a desideratum on any successful pluralist conception. Appealing to determination pluralism instead, which focuses on truth properties, it then proposes an alternative treatment to the Liar that shows liar sentences to be undecidable.


Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb

This chapter follows recent work in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, which rejects the standard, static picture of languages and highlights its context sensitivity—a dynamic theory of the nature of language. On the view advocated, human languages are things that we build on a conversation-by-conversation basis. The author calls such languages microlanguages. The chapter argues that thinking of languages in terms of microlanguages yields interesting consequences for how we should think about the liar paradox. In particular, we will see that microlanguages have admissible conditions that preclude liar-like sentences. On the view presented in the chapter, liar sentences are not even sentences of any microlanguage that we might construct (or assertorically utter). Accordingly, the proper approach to such a paradoxical sentence is to withhold the sentence—not permitting it to be admitted into our microlanguage unless, or until, certain sharpening occurs.


Author(s):  
Bradley Armour-Garb ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb

In this chapter, after introducing a few versions of the liar paradox and identifying the pathology that the versions of the paradox appear to present, the author considers some proposals for how to understand ‘paradox’ and goes on to offer a particular reading of that notion. He then identifies a number of projects the completion of which would contribute to our understanding—or, in some cases, our resolution—of the liar paradox and, after considering certain “treatments” of the paradox, highlights certain “revenge” problems that arise for such treatments. In the concluding section, the author summarizes each of the chapters that are contained in the volume.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Poppy Mankowitz

AbstractSome in the recent literature have claimed that a connection exists between the Liar paradox and semantic relativism: the view that the truth values of certain occurrences of sentences depend on the contexts at which they are assessed. Sagi (Erkenntnis 82(4):913–928, 2017) argues that contextualist accounts of the Liar paradox are committed to relativism, and Rudnicki and Łukowski (Synthese 1–20, 2019) propose a new account that they classify as relativist. I argue that a full understanding of how relativism is conceived within theories of natural language shows that neither of the purported connections can be maintained. There is no reason why a solution to the Liar paradox needs to accept relativism.


Mind ◽  
1955 ◽  
Vol LXIV (256) ◽  
pp. 543-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. P. USHENKO

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