Circularity in the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts

Here I address the “phenomenal concept strategy” for addressing anti-materialist intuitions, such as the explanatory gap, by appealing to the special nature of phenomenal concepts. I look in depth at several proposals, including John Perry’s influential presentation in Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, and argue that they all fail in meeting what I call the “materialist constraint”, which is the principle that no property or relation that is not realizable in physical properties or relations be appealed to in the account. I conclude that some relation such as acquaintance must be invoked to explain our first-person access to conscience experience, and that currently no materialist model for such a relation exists.

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Arg206Cys substitution in DNASE1L3 causes a defect in DNASE1L3 protein secretion that confers risk of systemic lupus erythematosus

Annals of the Rheumatic Diseases ◽

10.1136/annrheumdis-2020-218810 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. annrheumdis-2020-218810

Author(s):

Latanya N Coke ◽

Hongxiu Wen ◽

Mary Comeau ◽

Mustafa H Ghanem ◽

Andrew Shih ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Systemic Lupus Erythematosus ◽

Protein Secretion ◽

Lupus Erythematosus ◽

Conditional Analysis ◽

Hek293 Cells ◽

Enzyme Function ◽

European Ancestry ◽

Risk Haplotype ◽

Systemic Lupus ◽

Risk Association

ObjectivesTo determine if the polymorphism encoding the Arg206Cys substitution in DNASE1L3 explains the association of the DNASE1L3/PXK gene locus with systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) and to examine the effect of the Arg206Cys sequence change on DNASE1L3 protein function.MethodsConditional analysis for rs35677470 was performed on cases and controls with European ancestry from the SLE Immunochip study, and genotype and haplotype frequencies were compared. DNASE1L3 protein levels were measured in cells and supernatants of HEK293 cells and monocyte-derived dendritic cells expressing recombinant and endogenous 206Arg and 206Cys protein variants.ResultsConditional analysis on rs35677470 eliminated the SLE risk association signal for lead single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) rs180977001 and rs73081554, which are found to tag the same risk haplotype as rs35677470. The modest effect sizes of the SLE risk genotypes (heterozygous risk OR=1.14 and homozygous risk allele OR=1.68) suggest some DNASE1L3 endonuclease enzyme function is retained. An SLE protective signal in PXK (lead SNP rs11130643) remained following conditioning on rs35677470. The DNASE1L3 206Cys risk variant maintained enzymatic activity, but secretion of the artificial and endogenous DNASE1L3 206Cys protein was substantially reduced.ConclusionsSLE risk association in the DNASE1L3 locus is dependent on the missense SNP rs35677470, which confers a reduction in DNASE1L3 protein secretion but does not eliminate its DNase enzyme function.

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Conditional analysis of the major histocompatibility complex in rheumatoid arthritis

BMC Proceedings ◽

10.1186/1753-6561-3-s7-s36 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 3 (S7) ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Kimberly E Taylor ◽

Lindsey A Criswell

Keyword(s):

Rheumatoid Arthritis ◽

Major Histocompatibility Complex ◽

Conditional Analysis ◽

Major Histocompatibility ◽

Histocompatibility Complex

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Physicalism and the Intrinsic Nature of Consciousness

Dialogue ◽

10.1017/s0012217314000237 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 53 (2) ◽

pp. 203-228 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

PATRICK LEWTAS

Keyword(s):

Physical Properties ◽

Phenomenal Concepts ◽

Intrinsic Properties ◽

Intrinsic Nature ◽

Extrinsic Properties

This paper presents a metaphysical argument against physicalism based on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. It argues that the physical, as physicalism must understand it, consists entirely of extrinsic properties, whereas consciousness involves at least some intrinsic properties. It concludes that consciousness has non-physical properties and that physicalism is false. The paper then defends its premises against current physicalist thinking. As much as possible, it offers metaphysical arguments about physical and conscious properties rather than epistemological arguments about our physical and phenomenal concepts.

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