Computational Predictions for OCD Pathophysiology and Treatment: A Review

Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) can manifest as a debilitating disease with high degrees of co-morbidity as well as clinical and etiological heterogenity. However, the underlying pathophysiology is not clearly understood. Computational psychiatry is an emerging field in which behavior and its neural correlates are quantitatively analyzed and computational models are developed to improve understanding of disorders by comparing model predictions to observations. The aim is to more precisely understand psychiatric illnesses. Such computational and theoretical approaches may also enable more personalized treatments. Yet, these methodological approaches are not self-evident for clinicians with a traditional medical background. In this mini-review, we summarize a selection of computational OCD models and computational analysis frameworks, while also considering the model predictions from a perspective of possible personalized treatment. The reviewed computational approaches used dynamical systems frameworks or machine learning methods for modeling, analyzing and classifying patient data. Bayesian interpretations of probability for model selection were also included. The computational dissection of the underlying pathology is expected to narrow the explanatory gap between the phenomenological nosology and the neuropathophysiological background of this heterogeneous disorder. It may also contribute to develop biologically grounded and more informed dimensional taxonomies of psychopathology.

A Skeptical View on the Physics-Consciousness Explanatory Gap

The epistemological chasm between how we (implicitly and subjectively) perceive or imagine the actual world and how we (explicitly and “objectively”) think of its underlying entities has motivated perhaps the most disconcerting impasse in human thought: the explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical properties of the world. Here, I advocate a combination of philosophical skepticism and simplicity as an informed approach to arbitrate among theories of consciousness. I argue that the explanatory gap is rightly a gap in our understanding, but one that is not surprising; and we being observers biased by our first-person perspective and our existence may both hinder and (the realization we have them) assist our reasoning. Further, I unfold the concept of observer into two distinct notions based on its functional and phenomenal aspects, and exploit this device to elucidate the subject-observer relationship. Then, I proceed to analyze the philosophical zombie dilemma. Lastly, I contend that from a skeptical viewpoint, panpsychism (or neutral monism) is the most parsimonious doctrine accounting for the explanatory gap, and suggest that it would be possible to make headway in the hard problem of consciousness by uncovering non-trivial causal relationships between qualia states and functional states, if routine and controlled manipulation of neural circuits were easily available.

The colored-brain thesis

The “colored-brain thesis”, or strong qualitative physicalism, is discussed from historical and philosophical perspectives. This thesis was proposed by Thomas Case (1888), in a non-materialistic context, and is close to views explored by H. H. Price (1932) and E. Boring (1933). Using Mary’s room thought experiment, one can argue that physicalism implies qualitative physicalism. Qualitative physicalism involves three basic statements: (i) perceptual internalism, and realism of qualia; (ii) ontic physicalism, charaterized as a description in space, time, and scale; and (iii) mind-brain identity thesis. In addition, (iv) structuralism in physics, and distinguishing the present version from that suggested by H. Feigl and S. Pepper, (v) realism of the physical description. The “neurosurgeon argument” is presented, as to why the greenness of a visually perceived avocado, which (according to this view) is present in the brain as a physical-chemical attribute, would not be seen as green by a neurosurgeon who opens the observer’s skull. This conception is compared with two close views, Russellian (and Schlickian) monisms and panprotopsychism (including panqualityism). According to the strong qualitative physicalism presented here, the phenomenal experience of a quale q is identical to a physico-chemical quality q, which arises from a combination of (1) the materiality wassociated with the brain, and (2) the causal organization or structure of the relevant elements of the brain S, including in this organization the structure of the self: (Sw)q. The “explanatory gap” between mental and physical states is shifted to a gap between the physico-chemical qualities q and the organized materiality of a specific brain region (Sw)q, and is seen as being bridged only by a set of non-explanatory postulates. Keywords: Colored-brain thesis, qualitative physicalism, mind-brain identity thesis, qualia, panprotopsychism, sensorium.

Choice and Social Stability: The Morphogenesis of a Sociodynamic Constant

<p>This essay uses an example of Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach to sociodynamics to explore the explanatory gap indicated in the following propositions:</p> <p>1. Individuals act and interact in variable ways from constantly shifting states-of-affairs in pursuit of variable and inconsistent interests;</p> <p>2. Groups are made-up of individuals and their actions/interactions;</p> <p>3. The vast majority of groups, current and historic, are stable.</p> <p>It contends that individuals’ choices resolve the problem: the analytical centrality of (neo-Bayesian) predictability to every choice no matter the context bridges the explanatory gap between individual actions and the large-scale sociological phenomena of social stability; in the same way, the analytical centrality of stability to groups and group structures allows us to identify the predictable paths of agency. This analytical dualism is used to identify the mutual morphogenesis of both sociodynamic ‘poles’ in the example...individual and collective, ‘micro’ and ‘macro’, agent and structure-culture, in a way applicable to a wide range of rigorous sociological inquiry.</p>

Choice and Social Stability: The Morphogenesis of a Sociodynamic Constant

<p>This essay uses an example of Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach to sociodynamics to explore the explanatory gap indicated in the following propositions:</p> <p>1. Individuals act and interact in variable ways from constantly shifting states-of-affairs in pursuit of variable and inconsistent interests;</p> <p>2. Groups are made-up of individuals and their actions/interactions;</p> <p>3. The vast majority of groups, current and historic, are stable.</p> <p>It contends that individuals’ choices resolve the problem: the analytical centrality of (neo-Bayesian) predictability to every choice no matter the context bridges the explanatory gap between individual actions and the large-scale sociological phenomena of social stability; in the same way, the analytical centrality of stability to groups and group structures allows us to identify the predictable paths of agency. This analytical dualism is used to identify the mutual morphogenesis of both sociodynamic ‘poles’ in the example...individual and collective, ‘micro’ and ‘macro’, agent and structure-culture, in a way applicable to a wide range of rigorous sociological inquiry.</p>

A language for qualia: on verbal influence of the phenomenal

Despite several decades of intense scrutiny, the problem of the “explanatory gap” remains one of the most topical issues in today’s cognitive sciences. This paper argues that, if re-articulated as the (relative) ineffability of phenomenal properties of sensory experiences, it can become an object of linguistic treatment to a sensible effect. The paper proceeds from discussing the problem of ineffability at large to a brief analysis of the current accounts of phenomenal mental states. It then proposes a tentative descriptive framework for phenomenal judgments, i.e. statements involving reference to the speaker’s qualia. The main argument of the paper consists in relativization of the ineffability thesis and in establishing that phenomenal contents can be communicated verbally via a special type of discursive units––phenomemes––by way of referencing relational properties of the sensory experiences in question. In the concluding section, the paper suggests that phenomemes constitute a narrative dimension and highlights the potential of further research on the subject for the pragmatics of communication, cognitive stylistics, and other areas of the language-related scholarship.

A language for qualia: on verbal influence of the phenomenal

Despite several decades of intense scrutiny, the problem of the “explanatory gap” remains one of the most topical issues in today’s cognitive sciences. This paper argues that, if re-articulated as the (relative) ineffability of phenomenal properties of sensory experiences, it can become an object of linguistic treatment to a sensible effect. The paper proceeds from discussing the problem of ineffability at large to a brief analysis of the current accounts of phenomenal mental states. It then proposes a tentative descriptive framework for phenomenal judgments, i.e. statements involving reference to the speaker’s qualia. The main argument of the paper consists in relativization of the ineffability thesis and in establishing that phenomenal contents can be communicated verbally via a special type of discursive units––phenomemes––by way of referencing relational properties of the sensory experiences in question. In the concluding section, the paper suggests that phenomemes constitute a narrative dimension and highlights the potential of further research on the subject for the pragmatics of communication, cognitive stylistics, and other areas of the language-related scholarship.

What Is It Like to Be a Dolphin? Echolocation and Subjectivity in Video Games

Echolocation is a rare ability of some bats, dolphins, and humans with reduced sightedness or visual impairment. Often visualized as a type of auditory sight, echolocation has no true analog for sighted humans without the ability, resulting in a wide range of interpretations when game designers attempt to capture this subjective experience. Video games have depicted echolocation with varying degrees of fidelity and realism, from musical scales and maps to fully realized three-dimensional worlds. This variety may be attributed in part to the inaccessible experience of the echolocating subjects. Designers must rely on their own subjective experiences to create a mental image of this ability. Synthesizing aspects of acoustic and biological sciences, philosophy, and disability studies, this article examines depictions of echolocation in video games, demonstrating that games require players to incorporate their own experiences in order to bridge the “explanatory gap” between the subjective experiences of visually impaired characters and knowledge of the objective processes of echolocation that are accessible to sighted players. With examples from Ecco the Dolphin (1992) and Perception (2017), this article will show that designers support their echolocation mechanics with narrative and supplementary information rather than actualizing the experience with gameplay.