scholarly journals The agential perspective: a hard-line reply to the four-case manipulation argument

2019 ◽  
Vol 177 (7) ◽  
pp. 1935-1951
Author(s):  
Sofia Jeppsson
Keyword(s):  
Manipulation Argument

scholarly journals Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-73
Author(s):  
TAYLOR W. CYR
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Manipulation Argument ◽  
Manipulation Arguments ◽  
Theoretical Cost ◽  
Freedom And Responsibility

AbstractIn response to the increasingly popular manipulation argument against compatibilism, some have argued that libertarian accounts of free will are vulnerable to parallel manipulation arguments, and thus manipulation is not uniquely problematic for compatibilists. The main aim of this article is to give this point a more detailed development than it has previously received. Prior attempts to make this point have targeted particular libertarian accounts but cannot be generalized. By contrast, I provide an appropriately modified manipulation that targets all libertarian accounts of freedom and responsibility—an especially tricky task given that libertarian accounts are a motley set. I conclude that if manipulation arguments reveal any theoretical cost then it is one borne by all accounts according to which we are free and responsible, not by compatibilism in particular.

Selective Hard Compatibilism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Russell
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Relevant Issue ◽  
Manipulation Argument

This chapter takes up a well-known objection to the compatibilist position, which is “the manipulation argument” and related arguments based on covert control. It is argued that we should reject soft compatibilist responses to cases of this kind that rely on considerations of “history” to exclude manipulated or covertly controlled agents from responsible agency. Instead a modified form of hard compatibilism is defended, one that grants something problematic about cases of this kind but rejects the claim that agents in these conditions are not responsible. The relevant issue is not that these agents are not responsible but that their manipulators or covert controllers are not entitled to hold them responsible. Selective hard compatibilism maintains that what is compromised in these circumstances is not the moral responsibility of the agent (where robust compatibilist conditions of a relevant kind are satisfied) but the participant stance or moral standing of their manipulators.

Fair Opportunity, Capacities, and Possibilities

2021 ◽  
pp. 81-102
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
Manipulation Argument ◽  
Alternate Possibilities

Though some compatibilists deny that responsibility requires alternate possibilities, fair opportunity requires the ability of wrongdoers to do otherwise. However, these alternate possibilities are not the ones precluded by determinism. Different kinds of capacities are distinguished—actual and potential, specific and general. We should be interested in actual capacities that are relatively specific. The relevant capacities can be identified via counterfactuals. In this chapter, Pereboom’s influential incompatibilist manipulation argument is examined and rejected.

scholarly journals The manipulation argument and Frankfurt-style compatibilism

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-73
Author(s):  
Nedzib Prasevic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Manipulation Argument ◽  
Tacit Assumptions ◽  
Intense Debate

In the metaphysics of free will, the most intense debate at this time is that between Frankfurt-style compatibilists and proponents of the manipulation argument centred around the appropriate answer to the question of whether a compatibilisticaly defined agents can be morally responsible if they are a victim of manipulation? In this paper, I aim to explain the reasons behind the dispute as well as bring attention to certain tacit assumptions that underpin the concept of the manipulation argument and that Frankfurt-style compatibilists need to reject. For this reason, my conclusions is that Frankfurt-style compatibilists must accept the counter-intuitive possibility that agents can have moral responsibility for their actions despite being a victim of manipulation.

scholarly journals The Parallel Manipulation Argument

Ethics ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 126 (4) ◽  
pp. 1075-1089 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taylor W. Cyr
Keyword(s):  
Manipulation Argument
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