Remarks on the logic of imagination. A step towards understanding doxastic control through imagination

Synthese ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 194 (8) ◽  
pp. 2843-2861 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heinrich Wansing
Author(s):  
Melissa Anne-Marie Curley

Miki Kiyoshi (1897–1945) worked at the intersection of Marxism and Kyoto School philosophy. His later work explored the place of imagination in the historical dialectic. Miki held that the power of imagination was apparent in myths, institutions, and technologies, each of which represented the mediation of subjective will and objective reason. This subjective will could be either individual or collective—in his discussion of the institution, Miki posited that a collective subject he referred to as “creative society” drove the creation of new historical forms. Miki described creative society moving toward a new form of egalitarian fellowship that would transcend the existing state; Iwasaki Minoru points out, however, that Miki’s logic was used by the state to support its imperialist projects in Asia. The chapter closes by suggesting the possibility of rehabilitating Miki’s logic of imagination by refocusing on his treatment of affect and desire.


2019 ◽  
pp. 141-158
Author(s):  
Francesco Berto ◽  
Mark Jago

Imagination seems to have a logic, albeit one which is hyperintensional and sensitive to context. This chapter offers a semantics of imagination, with operators expressing ‘imaginative acts’ of mental simulation. A number of conditions that could be imposed on the semantics are then discussed, in order to validate certain inferences. One important issue is how acts of imagination interact with disjunction: one can imagine some disjunction as obtaining without being imaginatively specific about which disjunction obtains. This chapter subsequently turns to non-monotonicity: how B may follow from imagining that A, but not from imagining that A ∧ C. Finally, the Principle of Imaginative Equivalents is discussed.


Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Carry Osborne

ABSTRACTThe contemporary debate over responsibility for belief is divided over the issue of whether such responsibility requires doxastic control, and whether this control must be voluntary in nature. It has recently become popular to hold that responsibility for belief does not require voluntary doxastic control, or perhaps even any form of doxastic ‘control’ at all. However, Miriam McCormick has recently argued that doxastic responsibility does in fact require quasi-voluntary doxastic control: “guidance control,” a complex, compatibilist form of control. In this paper, I pursue a negative and a positive task. First, I argue that grounding doxastic responsibility in guidance control requires too much for agents to be the proper targets for attributions of doxastic responsibility. I will focus my criticisms on three cases in which McCormick's account gives the intuitively wrong verdict. Second, I develop a modified conception of McCormick's notion of “ownership of belief,” which I call Weak Doxastic Ownership. I employ this conception to argue that responsibility for belief is possible even in the absence of guidance control. In doing so, I argue that the notion of doxastic ownership can do important normative work in grounding responsibility for belief without being subsumed under or analyzed in terms of the notion of doxastic control.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blake Roeber
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2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Oliveri

Through the reconstruction of Leibniz's theory of the degrees of knowledge, this e-book investigates and explores the intrinsic relationship of imagination with space and time. The inquiry into this relationship defines the logic of imagination that characterizes both human and non-human animals, albeit differently, making them two different species of imaginative animals. Lucia Oliveri explains how the emergence of language in human animals goes hand in hand with the emergence of thought and a different form of rationality constituted by logical inferences based on identity and contradiction, principles that are out of reach of the imagination. The e-book concludes that the presence of innate principles in human animals transforms the way in which they sense-perceive the world, thereby constantly increasing the distinction between human and non-human animals.


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