scholarly journals A principled approach to defining actual causation

Synthese ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 195 (2) ◽  
pp. 835-862 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sander Beckers ◽  
Joost Vennekens
Keyword(s):  
Erkenntnis ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 78 (S1) ◽  
pp. 85-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Baumgartner

Author(s):  
Joseph Y. Halpern

Recent work in psychology and experimental philosophy has shown that judgments of actual causation are often influenced by consideration of defaults, typicality, and normality. This chapter shows the definition of causality introduced in Chapter 2 can be extended to defaults, typicality, and normality into account. The resulting framework takes actual causation to be both graded and comparative. Thus, it allows us to say that one cause is better than another. Examples showing the power of the approach are considered.


Author(s):  
Joseph Y. Halpern

Causality plays a central role in the way people structure the world; we constantly seek causal explanations for our observations. But what does it even mean that an event C “actually caused” event E? The problem of defining actual causation goes beyond mere philosophical speculation. For example, in many legal arguments, it is precisely what needs to be established in order to determine responsibility. The philosophy literature has been struggling with the problem of defining causality since Hume. In this book, Joseph Halpern explores actual causality, and such related notions as degree of responsibility, degree of blame, and causal explanation. The goal is to arrive at a definition of causality that matches our natural language usage and is helpful, for example, to a jury deciding a legal case, a programmer looking for the line of code that cause some software to fail, or an economist trying to determine whether austerity caused a subsequent depression. Halpern applies and expands an approach to causality that he and Judea Pearl developed, based on structural equations. He carefully formulates a definition of causality, and building on this, defines degree of responsibility, degree of blame, and causal explanation. He concludes by discussing how these ideas can be applied to such practical problems as accountability and program verification.


Author(s):  
Peter Menzies

Counterfactual isomorphs are pairs of systems where: (1) the pattern of counterfactual dependence among the variables is isomorphic; but (2) the relations of actual causation need not be. Counterfactual isomorphs present a prima facie challenge to any theory of actual causation that is framed in terms of counterfactuals. Menzies responds to this problem by proposing that actual causation be defined in terms of counterfactual dependence under ideal coonditions. Determination of what constitute ideal conditions is motivated by the intuition that actual causation should depend only on the intrinsic process consisting of the events connecting the cause and the effect. Since counterfactual isomorphs need not have isomorphic ideal conditions, they can differ with respect to relations of actual causation.


2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard W. Wright

AbstractFor the last 40 years, efficiency theorists have attempted to demonstrate that tort liability in general and negligence liability in particular can best/only be explained by the hypothesis that judges are trying to maximize aggregate social welfare. Thirty years ago I published a pair of articles criticizing these attempts, noting especially the efficiency theorists’ inability to explain and justify the factual causation requirement in tort law. Nevertheless, the efficiency theorists have continued to make the same arguments. In this paper, I canvass the old arguments and their current restatements, including the attempts by some of the leading theorists to equate ex post analysis of actual causation with ex ante analysis of negligent conduct and attempts by others to explain the actual negligence liability rules. None of the rules proposed by the efficiency theorists is consistent with the practice of the courts, and none of them would promote efficient deterrence. Worse yet, the least descriptively plausible negligence liability rule proposed by the efficiency theorists is the one likely to be the least inefficient in actual practice, while the one assumed by most efficiency theorists will be the most inefficient. The fundamental problem with the efficiency theories is that they assume that the focus of law should be and is on the maximization of aggregate social welfare, rather than justice – the promotion of everyone’s equal external freedom in their interactions with others.


2011 ◽  
Vol 78 (5) ◽  
pp. 900-913 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. Twardy ◽  
Kevin B. Korb
Keyword(s):  

Synthese ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 175 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clark Glymour ◽  
David Danks ◽  
Bruce Glymour ◽  
Frederick Eberhardt ◽  
Joseph Ramsey ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

Topoi ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 835-843 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margherita Benzi

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