Exchange Rate Regime, Central Bank Independence, and Political Business Cycles in Brazil

2008 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taeko Hiroi
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Business Cycles ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Political Business Cycles

scholarly journals Political Business Cycles and Central Bank Independence

2003 ◽  
Vol 113 (486) ◽  
pp. C167-C181 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Maloney ◽  
Andrew C. Pickering ◽  
Kaddour Hadri
Keyword(s):  
Business Cycles ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Political Business Cycles

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions

2002 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-723 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Bernhard ◽  
J. Lawrence Broz ◽  
William Roberts Clark
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Open Economy ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Time Inconsistency ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
Exchange Rate Arrangements

In recent decades, countries have experimented with a variety of monetary institutions, including alternative exchange-rate arrangements and different levels of central bank independence. Political economists have analyzed the choice of these institutions, emphasizing their role in resolving both the time-inconsistency problem and dilemmas created by an open economy. This “first-generation” work, however, suffers from a central limitation: it studies exchange-rate regimes and central bank institutions in isolation from one another without investigating how one monetary institution affects the costs and benefits of the other. By contrast, the contributors to this volume analyze the choice of exchange-rate regime and central bank independence together and, in so doing, present a “second generation” of research on the determinants of monetary institutions. The articles incorporate both economic and political factors in explaining the choice of monetary institutions, investigating how political institutions, democratic processes, political party competition, and interest group pressures affect the balance between economic and distributional policy objectives.

scholarly journals Rulers of the game: central bank independence during the interwar years

1996 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beth A. Simmons
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Left Wing ◽  
Domestic Price ◽  
External Adjustment ◽  
Fixed Exchange Rate

Central bank independence is associated with restrictive monetary choices that can be deflationary within fixed exchange-rate regimes. Because central banks act to counteract domestic inflation, they put a premium on domestic price stability at the expense of international monetary stability. Evidence from fifteen countries between 1925 and 1938 shows that the more independent central banks took more deflationary policies than were necessary for external adjustment. Central banks in general were more restrictive under left-wing governments than they were under more conservative regimes and often were more restrictive than required for external equilibration. This suggests that policies of independent central banks designed to enhance domestic price stability may force deflationary pressures onto other states in the system and potentially destabilize a fixed exchange-rate regime.

Business cycles and the exchange-rate regime

1989 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Baxter ◽  
Alan C. Stockman
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Business Cycles ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
The Exchange Rate

scholarly journals Monetary Policy Analysis in Serbia

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 147-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vesna Martin
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Exchange Rate Regime ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Exchange Rate Policy ◽  
Floating Exchange Rate ◽  
National Bank ◽  
Main Regulator

Abstract The paper focuses on analysing monetary policy in Serbia. The National Bank of Serbia chose inflation targeting, which sets price stability as the main objective of monetary policy. To achieve this goal, the central bank uses different monetary policy instruments which analysis can provide us with the understanding of the main directions of their actions but also of the limitations of its application. Only through improvement of both instruments and monetary policy the central bank will create a better foundation for achieving monetary stability. In addition, the implementation of exchange rate policy is entrusted to the National Bank of Serbia, as the main regulator of the financial system. A mere use of managed floating exchange rate, as the chosen exchange rate regime, is an appropriate solution in the current economic circumstances and in accordance with the desired objective of monetary policy.

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