(Un)Natural Disasters: Electoral Cycles in Disaster Relief

Emergency spending is often exempt from campaign period restrictions and procurement guidelines, making it attractive for opportunistic politicians, but natural disasters are seen as outside political business cycles. However, droughts are frequent but challenging to measure, so politicians can leverage discretion for electoral gain. This paper analyzes electoral cycles, term limits, and partisan targeting around municipal drought declaration in Northeast Brazil. Two sources of exogeneity (rainfall shocks, electoral calendar) isolate the effect of non-climatic factors on drought declarations. I find that drought declarations, which trigger relief, are more likely in mayoral election years. Incumbents are more likely to win re-election if they declare a drought in the election year, during below or even above average rainfall. The results are consistent with interviews suggesting voters reward competent mayors and mayors trade relief for votes. This study highlights the interaction between distributive and environmental politics, which has increasing consequences due to climate change.

Seçimlerin Ekonomik Etkileri: Türkiye Üzerine Bir Uygulama

This study aims to explore the effects of election periods on the economy from the perspective of the “public choice theory”. We selected our variables from among those focused by the research that examine elections from the standpoint of political business cycles; i.e., exports, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Wholesale Price Index(TEFE), the number of unemployed, and non-performing loans. Then, we constructed simultaneous models in which these variables were explored as endogenous variables. We used dummy variables for general and local elections in these models and identified 2002:04-2020:04 as our study period. We estimated the coefficients for the econometric models we constructed by using the Engle-Granger and Dynamic Least Squares methods. Our analysis results demonstrate that manipulative decisions and arrangements made before elections do not always create business cycles. Expenditures during election periods impose a permanent burden on the system and the economic arrangements during election periods may not result in political business cycles. Moreover, it is harder for the government in power to manipulate policy objectives than to manipulate policy instruments. Because policy instruments such as public expenditure and money supply are largely controlled by the government in power, while government intervention in indicators such as Gross National Product, exports, inflation, and unemployment is relatively limited. Keywords: Engle-Granger Method, Dynamic Least Squares method, Political Business Cycles. Jel Code: E32, C01, G18

Time-series topic analysis using singular spectrum transformation for detecting political business cycles

Herein, we present a novel topic variation detection method that combines a topic extraction method and a change-point detection method. It extracts topics from time-series text data as the feature of each time and detects change points from the changing patterns of the extracted topics. We applied this method to analyze the valuable, albeit underutilized, text dataset containing the Japanese Prime Minister’s (PM’s) detailed daily activities for over 32 years. The proposed method and data provide novel insights into the empirical analyses of political business cycles, which is a classical issue in economics and political science. For instance, as our approach enables us to directly observe and analyze the PM’s actions, it can overcome the empirical challenges encountered by previous research owing to the unobservability of the PM’s behavior. Our empirical observations are primarily consistent with recent theoretical developments regarding this topic. Despite limitations, by employing a completely novel method and dataset, our approach enhances our understanding and provides new insights into this classic issue.

The Applicability of Political Business Cycle Theories in Transition Economies

The paper focuses the applicability of political cycles theories in specific circumstances of economies in transition which are at the same time the new democracies. Economic and political transition in these countries change both people’s and politicians’ preferences, institutions and generate specific politically motivated misuse of economic policymaking. Theories of political cycles in macroeconomics have been developed since 1970s, when the fact that policymakers could use economic policy as an efficient tool for increasing their chances for reelection became obvious. In countries with parliamentary democracies, incentives of policymakers to influence election results could be opportunistically motivated (opportunistic models) or ideologically motivated (partisan models). On the other side, voters could be naïve or rational, with different economic outcomes, as argued in extensive political cycles literature. The paper studies specific political motives of politicians in transition economies which are faced, especially in first fazes of transition with weak institutional mechanism and rules, and naïve voters. Consequently, opportunistic motives dominate ideological ones. The paper also focuses how the development of the institutional environment, especially in the context of international integration, such as accession to the European Union, reflects on the political business cycles in these countries.

Political cycles in the conditions of formation of the information network society

In the cyclical dynamics of the capitalist world system, politics and economics are closely intertwined, which is manifested in the development of political business cycles of individual countries, as well as in the development of cyclical political and economic processes in the long run on a global scale. The development of political business cycles is due to the influence of interrelated factors - competition of political forces, economic expectations and political preferences of voters. The immanent to the capitalist world-system deep internal contradictions lead to a variety of forms of long-term socio-economic cycles, including such a form as political cycles of a global nature. In the modern conditions of transition from the industrial-market system to the information-network society, the factors continue to exist and the contradictions emerge that both lead to the development of political cycles. Technical and technological transformations that contribute to the formation of information and network society, are strengthening the possibilities of ideological and propaganda activities that affect the cyclical political and economic processes. In such conditions, political cycles are becoming more and more emergent, which is largely due to the influence of social networks, computer games, and "new media" on people's political preferences and their political activity. The cyclical processes of establishing economic and political hegemony in the capitalist world system determine the dominance of the political cycles of leading countries over those of less developed countries. Improving production and dissemination technologies enhances the ability of leading countries to influence the political cycles of less developed countries, and the use of "soft power" is becoming an increasingly important tool of geopolitical struggle in the process of deployment of long-term global political cycles.

Vote Buying or (Political) Business (Cycles) as Usual?

We report robust evidence of a new short-run monetary election cycle: the monthly growth rate of the money supply (M1) around elections is higher than in other months in a sample of low- and middle-income countries. We hypothesize this is related to systemic vote buying. Consistent with this, we find no cycle in authoritarian countries and countries with strong political institutions and a pronounced cycle in elections where international election monitors reported vote buying or in close elections. Using survey data on daily consumer expenditures, we show that within-household consumption of food increases in the days before elections.