Energy Security in Danger? A Comparative Analysis of Oil and Copper Supply

This study aims to examine energy security in terms of crude oil and copper supply. While oil remains the leading energy commodity globally, copper is crucial for many new technologies, foremost for RES. Therefore, both oil and copper are extremely important for current and future energy security. This article contains a bivariate methodological approach to a comparative analysis of oil and copper supply: determining supply security with an Index of security of supply, and examines price stability with generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models. This research provides evidence that there are many differences but also significant similarities between these two completely different commodities in terms of both supply security and price stability. Facing the future for RES, significant demand may cause a threat to energy security on a previously unknown scale. Therefore this instability, both supply- and price-related, appears to be the main threat to future energy security.

INCOME ANALYSIS OF VEGETABLE TRADERS IN AIKMEL TRADITIONAL MARKET AIKMEL SUB DISTRICT EAST LOMBOK REGENCY

Market is a place for public facilities to complete the needs of the community and is a center for community commerce. Not only that, the market continues to play a role for price stability, where market value is one of the benchmarks for assessing inflation. The purpose of this study was to determine the income of vegetable traders in Aikmel Traditional Market, Aikmel District, East Lombok Regency and to find out the obstacles faced by vegetable traders in running their business at Aikmel Traditional Market, Aikmel District. The determination of the research area was carried out by purposive sampling, namely based on certain considerations in accordance with the research objectives. Considerations for choosing the Aikmel Traditional Market where the research was conducted, because the Aikmel Market is classified as the type of vegetables that are sold, it is very complete and the traders there pick them up quite close to the source of the farmers, besides that the Aikmel market provides comfort and peace when transacting. The sampling method is by using the census method.

ANALISIS FORMULASI KEBIJAKAN PEMERINTAH DALAM MENJAGA STABILITAS HARGA PANGAN DI KABUPATEN PANGKEP

Tujuan dalam penelitian ini yaitu 1) untuk menganalisis formulasi kebijakan pemerintah dalam menjaga stabilitas harga pangan beras Kabupaten Pangkep. 2) Untuk menganalisis faktor penghambat dan pendukung dalam membuat formulasi kebijakan stabilitas harga pangan beras Kabupaten Pangkep. Metode penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dimaksudkan dapat menggali informasi sebanyak mungkin dari masalah penelitian. Hasil penelitian menunjukan bahwa 1) Formulasi kebijakan pemerintah dalam menjaga stabilitas harga pangan beras Kabupaten Pangkep bahwa ada kebijakan pemerintah dalam menjaga stabilitas harga pangan beras Kabupaten Pangkep, karena pihak dinas ketahanan pangan daerah kabupaten pangkep selalu mengkoordinasi dengan dinas ketahanan pangan provinsi dan juga selalu ada pengawasan dari dinas ketahanan pangan kabupaten pangkep terhadap pihak produsen atau penjual beras di pasar sentral pangkep dalam menjaga harga beras agar masyarakat tidak keberatan membeli beras, dan untuk sampai sekarang ini pihak produsen atau penjual mengikuti Pasal 56 UU No. 18 Tahun 2012 dan Peraturan Menteri Perdagangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 24 Tahun 2020 Tentang Penetapan Harga Pembelian Pemerintah Untuk Gabah Atau Beras pada pasal 3 ayat 1 poin c. 2) Faktor penghambat dan pendukung dalam membuat formulasi kebijakan stabilitas harga pangan beras Kabupaten Pangkep bahwa dari faktor penghambat pihak pemerintah masih berupayah agar gapoptan yang ada di kabupaten pangkep memiliki mesin penggiling yang menghasilkan beras premium untuk mengurangi dan membatasi pembeli gabah dari luar kabupaten pangkep faktor cuaca dan pupuk, karena cuaca sangat berpengaruh dalam mengeringkan gabah dan pada saat selesai menggiling gabah. faktor pendukung dalam penetapan harga pada tingkat produsen sebagai pedoman pembelian pemerintah sebesar Rp 8.300,00 yaitu operasional terhadap harga beras dan gabah meningkan maka pihak Dinas Bulog dan denas ketahanan panagan selalu melakukan pasar murah agar harga beras dan gabah turun, dengan cara mensterilkan harga beras dan gabah di kabupaten pangkep. The objectives of this study are 1) to analyze the formulation of government policies in maintaining the stability of food prices for rice in Pangkep Regency. 2) To analyze the inhibiting and supporting factors in formulating a policy for food price stability in Pangkep Regency. This research method using qualitative research methods is intended to be able to dig up as much information as possible from the research problem. The results showed that 1) The formulation of government policies in maintaining the stability of rice food prices in Pangkep Regency that there was a government policy in maintaining the stability of rice food prices in Pangkep Regency, because the Pangkep Regency regional food security service always coordinated with the provincial food security service and there was always supervision. from the Pangkep district food security service to rice producers or sellers in the Pangkep central market in maintaining rice prices so that people do not mind buying rice, and so far the producers or sellers have followed Article 56 of Law no. 18 of 2012 and Regulation of the Minister of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia Number 24 of 2020 concerning Determination of Government Purchase Prices for Grain or Rice in article 3 paragraph 1 point c. 2) The inhibiting and supporting factors in formulating the policy for food price stability in Pangkep Regency are that of the inhibiting factors, the government is still trying to ensure that Gapoptan in Pangkep Regency has a grinding machine that produces premium rice to reduce and limit unhulled buyers from outside Pangkep Regency. and fertilizers, because the weather is very influential in drying the grain and when finished grinding the grain. the supporting factor in determining the price at the producer level as a guide for government purchases of Rp. 8,300.00, namely the operation of increasing the price of rice and unhulled rice, the Bureau of Logistics and Food Security Denas always conduct a low-cost market so that the price of rice and unhulled rice decreases, by sterilizing the price of rice and rice. grain in Pangkep district.

The Actual Independence of the Governors of the Central Bank of Iraq and its Effects on Inflation for the Period 2003-2017

This research presents indicators that were used In estimating the independence of the Central Bank of Iraq, which distinguish between the law independence (de jure autonomy) and the actual independence (de facto autonomy) for the three central bank governors for the period 2003-2017, through the turnover rate index of governors (TOR). The research also provides a new indicator of the turnover rate of members in the executive authority in Iraq for the same period, and the effects on inflation. The study also outlines a set of behavioral indicators ​​for governors that highlight the effects of actual independence on inflation. The main findings of the research were that the actual independence, in terms of the turnover rate index, gradually decreased for the research period, but the behavioral indicators of the governors showed that they maintain price stability. Therefore, the study presents evidence on the effect of the actual independence on inflation, because of the control of the exchange rate through the foreign currency auction and the decline of foreign reserves.

The ECB's neglected secondary mandate: An inter-institutional solution

The ECB’s secondary mandate requires it to the support broader economic policies by and in the EU. Until recently absent from the ECB strategy, the secondary mandate features prominently in the ECB’s 2021 review of its monetary policy strategy. This report asks: How should the ECB interpret the many objectives that the secondary mandate mentions? And how should it act on them? A more prominent role for its secondary mandate fits well with the new, more political role of the ECB, but it should not act on the secondary mandate alone. Why is that? The requirements that the legal text imposes on the ECB are paradoxical and difficult to reconcile. We explain the paradox in terms of three features. Firstly, the secondary mandate is binding on the ECB so that it must support the EU’s economic policies where this is possible without prejudice to price stability. However and secondly, the secondary mandate is also highly indeterminate because there are many relevant secondary objectives and ways to support them. Acting on the secondary mandate requires prioritising objectives and designing new instruments. Yet, thirdly, the ECB lacks the competence to develop its own policies to pursue the secondary objectives. For the ECB to simply choose its own secondary objectives and act on them raises severe legal and democratic objections. To resolve this paradoxical situation, we propose that the specification of the secondary objectives should take place via high-level coordination with the political institutions of the EU. Unlike direct instructions which are illegal under EU law, coordination would be compatible with central bank independence and strengthen the ECB’s ability to pursue price stability. We propose three main avenues to give shape to such interinstitutional coordination.

The Deutsche Bundesbank's Concept of Monetary Policy, With Particular Reference to its Choice of Intermediate Variables in the Period 1972-1979

<p>The maintenance of price stability is the Bundesbank's ultimate objective. The memory of two hyperinflations within a 30-year period has made the fight against inflation of paramount social and political importance. In the Bank's view inflation engenders uncertainties which may jeopardise capital investment on which the competitiveness of German industry as well as full employment and economic growth depends. The Bundesbank pursues this goal by setting the marginal cost of central bank money required by the banks to finance their expansion. Thus, both the liquidity of the banking system and the cost of borrowing are controlled. This does not necessarily mean that the banks' loan rate of interest is the Bundesbank's Intermediate target. In fact, the Bank does not have one single intermediate target. Since the Bank's views of the monetary sector are manifested in the form of an interlocking system of financial variables, the selection of an appropriate intermediate target depends on the actual economic situation. In this context, the money stock supply (M3) is seen by the Bundesbank as functionally related to bank lending and the accumulation of long-term funds at the banks (monetary capital formation). An increase in interest rates would reduce bank lending, stimulate monetary capital formation and hence reduce the money stock supply (M3). In addition, it would check the utilisation of the money stock supply. This is seen as important because once money has entered the system it may generate unacceptable expenditure flows. To control the growth of the money stock supply, the Bundesbank relies on monetary capital formation, because small stocks of public debt rule out large-scale open market operations. In the Bank's view monetary policy should aim at keeping the banks' loan rate of interest as closely as possible to the natural rate. Lags in this Wicksellian transmission process may arise if the banks have ample margins between their loan and deposit rates when a restrictive monetary policy is implemented. As deposit rates adjust sooner than loan rates to a change in market rates, this also blunts the immediate impact of a policy change. The Bundesbank favours flexible rates of exchange in order to safeguard the financial system against inflows of foreign capital. It would welcome an appreciation of the D-Mark as a contribution to price stability, even though it could result in a loss of employment and exports as it stimulates German business to invest abroad. Furthermore, the Bank aims at constraining the monetary disturbances arising from public sector deficits and collective wage bargaining by means of its annual monetary growth target. This should serve as a signal to non-banks, which they are supposed to internalise in their decision-making. During the review period, the effectiveness of these safeguards was small as witnessed by inflows of foreign capital, large public sector deficits and excessive wage settlements. Moreover, the Bundesbank has been confronted with the development of parallel markets, in particular the Eurocurrency markets, in which borrowers can avoid the effects of its constraints.</p>

The Deutsche Bundesbank's Concept of Monetary Policy, With Particular Reference to its Choice of Intermediate Variables in the Period 1972-1979

<p>The maintenance of price stability is the Bundesbank's ultimate objective. The memory of two hyperinflations within a 30-year period has made the fight against inflation of paramount social and political importance. In the Bank's view inflation engenders uncertainties which may jeopardise capital investment on which the competitiveness of German industry as well as full employment and economic growth depends. The Bundesbank pursues this goal by setting the marginal cost of central bank money required by the banks to finance their expansion. Thus, both the liquidity of the banking system and the cost of borrowing are controlled. This does not necessarily mean that the banks' loan rate of interest is the Bundesbank's Intermediate target. In fact, the Bank does not have one single intermediate target. Since the Bank's views of the monetary sector are manifested in the form of an interlocking system of financial variables, the selection of an appropriate intermediate target depends on the actual economic situation. In this context, the money stock supply (M3) is seen by the Bundesbank as functionally related to bank lending and the accumulation of long-term funds at the banks (monetary capital formation). An increase in interest rates would reduce bank lending, stimulate monetary capital formation and hence reduce the money stock supply (M3). In addition, it would check the utilisation of the money stock supply. This is seen as important because once money has entered the system it may generate unacceptable expenditure flows. To control the growth of the money stock supply, the Bundesbank relies on monetary capital formation, because small stocks of public debt rule out large-scale open market operations. In the Bank's view monetary policy should aim at keeping the banks' loan rate of interest as closely as possible to the natural rate. Lags in this Wicksellian transmission process may arise if the banks have ample margins between their loan and deposit rates when a restrictive monetary policy is implemented. As deposit rates adjust sooner than loan rates to a change in market rates, this also blunts the immediate impact of a policy change. The Bundesbank favours flexible rates of exchange in order to safeguard the financial system against inflows of foreign capital. It would welcome an appreciation of the D-Mark as a contribution to price stability, even though it could result in a loss of employment and exports as it stimulates German business to invest abroad. Furthermore, the Bank aims at constraining the monetary disturbances arising from public sector deficits and collective wage bargaining by means of its annual monetary growth target. This should serve as a signal to non-banks, which they are supposed to internalise in their decision-making. During the review period, the effectiveness of these safeguards was small as witnessed by inflows of foreign capital, large public sector deficits and excessive wage settlements. Moreover, the Bundesbank has been confronted with the development of parallel markets, in particular the Eurocurrency markets, in which borrowers can avoid the effects of its constraints.</p>

Price stability - major macroeconomic objective

Price is a basic element of the market economy system and has become a leading economic category, due to its functions within it. Ensuring price stability is a major objective of the governance process, as it contributes to creating a relatively stable economic framework that allows for economic development and ensuring a sustained level of economic growth. The global economic crises, in parallel with the regional political instability, aggravated by the devastating consequences of the pandemic situation, emphasize once again the importance of the dynamics of price developments on the macroeconomic situations of contemporary states.

An Interest Stabilisation Mechanism to Unburden the ECB

Following the twin crises of sovereign debt and COVID-19, the ECB risks being stuck in a situation of fiscal dominance, in which monetary policy is subordinated to the needs of finance ministers. A strong post-COVID-19 recovery may increase inflationary pressures, requiring a shift towards a less accommodative monetary policy stance. A tightening of monetary policy may, however, lead to a widening of interest rate spreads and new bond market tensions in the euro area. This article argues that the credibility of the ECB is undermined if it is perceived as aiming to close interest spreads. Interest spreads between euro countries arising from fiscal concerns should be a matter of fiscal policy, not monetary policy. The establishment of an interest stabilisation mechanism would allow the ECB to restore monetary dominance and to focus on maintaining price stability.