Retailers’ competition and cooperation in a closed-loop green supply chain under governmental intervention and cap-and-trade policy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chirantan Mondal ◽  
Bibhas C. Giri
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Governmental Intervention

scholarly journals Achieve a low carbon supply chain through product mix

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (10) ◽  
pp. 2468-2484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xu Chen ◽  
Xiaojun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Channel Structure ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Product Mix ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Carbon Supply ◽  
Trade Offs

Purpose In the era of climate change, industrial organizations are under increasing pressure from consumers and regulators to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of product mix as a strategy to deliver the low carbon supply chain under the cap-and-trade policy. Design/methodology/approach The authors incorporate the cap-and-trade policy into the green product mix decision models by using game-theoretic approach and compare these decisions in a decentralized model and a centralized model, respectively. The research explores potential behavioral changes under the cap-and-trade in the context of a two-echelon supply chain. Findings The analysis results show that the channel structure has significant impact on both economic and environmental performances. An integrated supply chain generates more profits. In contrast, a decentralized supply chain has lower carbon emissions. The cap-and-trade policy makes a different impact on the economic and environmental performances of the supply chain. Balancing the trade-offs is critical to ensure the long-term sustainability. Originality/value The research offers many interesting observations with respect to the effect of product mix strategy on operational decisions and the trade-offs between costs and carbon emissions under the cap-and-trade policy. The insights derived from the analysis not only help firms to make important operational and strategic decisions to reduce carbon emissions while maintaining their economic competitiveness, but also make meaningful contribution to governments’ policy making for carbon emissions control.

Analytics of cap-and-trade policy for dual supply chain network structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (10) ◽  
pp. 1999-2021
Author(s):  
Umangi Pathak ◽  
Ravi Kant ◽  
Ravi Shankar
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Network Structures ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Cap And Trade

scholarly journals Profit Distribution Model for Construction Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 1215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen Jiang ◽  
Wenfei Lu ◽  
Qianwen Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
General Contractor ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Pure Competition

Cap-and-trade has become one of the most widely used carbon emission limitation methods in the world. Its constraints have a great impact on the carbon emission reduction decisions and production operations of supply chain enterprises, as well as profit distribution. In the construction supply chain, there are few studies on the profit distribution and emission reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy. This paper investigates the profit distribution model of a two-echelon construction supply chain consisting of a general contractor and a subcontractor with cap-and-trade policy. Using game theory and Shapley value method, the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution under three cooperation modes of pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation are obtained, respectively. The research shows that the profits of the construction supply chain are increasing in pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation scenarios, and the emission reduction amount of the construction supply chain in the case of pure cooperation is greater than that of pure competition and co-opetition. The carbon emission reduction amount under the co-opetition scenario is not always greater than that under the pure competition scenario, which depends on the emission reduction cost coefficient relationship of general contractor and subcontractor. When the cost coefficient of emission reduction of the general contractor is less than that of the subcontractor, the emission reduction amount under pure competition is larger than that under co-opetition. A numerical study is carried out to verify the conclusions and illustrated the profits of the supply chain decreased with the increase of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and had nothing to do with the emission reduction efficiency of enterprises.

scholarly journals Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 4403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haixiang Wu ◽  
Bing Xu ◽  
Ding Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Variational Inequality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment

The green supply chain (GSC) can effectively reduce the waste of resources and avoid environmental pollution. For a closed-loop supply chain network consisting of multiple manufacturers, multiple retailers, and multiple consumer and recycling markets, we assume that retailers are responsible for the recycling of used products, manufacturers use raw materials to produce new products and recycled products for remanufacturing, and government departments subsidize all manufacturers and retailers for GSC technology investment. Then, the equilibrium conditions of manufacturers, retailers, demand markets, and recycling markets are obtained by using the variational inequality method, complementarity theorem, and Nash equilibrium theory, and the variational inequality model of the closed-loop supply chain network multiphase equilibrium is established. Based on numerical simulation, the optimal technology investment decision of green supply chain under different government subsidy rates, and the influence of market structure and enterprise cost asymmetry on the equilibrium solution of supply chain network are analyzed. The results show that government subsidies can effectively promote enterprises to upgrade their level of GSC technology investment. The intensification of enterprise competition and the asymmetry of enterprise costs will affect the composition of enterprise profits and the allocation of profits between enterprises, and the former will weaken the effect of government subsidies.

Pricing and greening strategies for a dual-channel closed-loop green supply chain

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 724-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Mondal ◽  
B. C. Giri ◽  
T. Maiti
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel
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