competition and cooperation
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2021 ◽  
Vol 2138 (1) ◽  
pp. 012005
Author(s):  
Haibo Li ◽  
Cheng Wang ◽  
Gengqian Wei ◽  
Sina Xu

Abstract Along with the evolution of passenger flows within cities, the coordination between public traffic lines should be sustainably optimized with respect to the spatial distribution of the flow, though the lines were planned well at the beginning of the construction. It is critical to determine the coopetition between bus lines to optimize a transit network continuously. A method of mining coopetition relationship (MCBTC, Mining Coopetition relationship between Bus lines based on a Time series Correlation) based on passenger flow is proposed in this study. First, noisy, inconsistent or missing data are eliminated to obtain a passenger flow time series, and the proposed merging algorithm is used to extract the line passenger flow time series (LPFTS, Line Passenger Flow Time Series) by merging the passenger flow of adjacent buses from the same line. Then, to calculate the positive and negative correlation sequence sets, a clustering algorithm is proposed. The two sequence sets represent the competition and cooperation relationships, respectively. The MCBTC method has been tested with a practical data set, and the results show that it is very promising.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dong Yan ◽  
Hongda Liu ◽  
Pinbo Yao

The objective of this research is to estimate the energy-saving intensities of nations within the European Union, applying varied equations of the DEA analysis, such as the DEA, modified radial equation, Russel dynamic envelope analysis, and the adjusted Russel Dynamic envelope Analysis, throughout the period of 2010–2018. Unlike other studies, this analysis seeks to unravel whether European nations are effective in increasing the EE finance of their respective economies. Because the European Union not only has geographical ties between regions, it is also a collection of interests of various sovereign states, its energy exhibits efficiency changes under the relationship of competition and cooperation under that economic effect. Regarding this circumstance, different dynamic envelope evaluations were formulated. One primary finding is that nations such as Germany, Sweden, or Austria attain robust ecological safeguard performance, seem to be using less energy, and are ecologically efficient relative to other nations such as Denmark, Belgium, Spain, France, or Ireland. Furthermore, a group of Eastern EU nations attained reduced efficiency marks, which could be categorized as anticipated, as a result of reduced technological implementation within the principal manufacturing sectors. The main result of this study is that few nations are performing in terms of efficiency. Additionally, RE (Renewable Energy) power production expands as nations’ dynamic envelope analysis marks and creates inefficient governments nearer to the efficiency frontline. Inversely, the presence of peak-time power consumption reduced the dynamic envelope analysis marks and increased the distance from the Frontier of efficiency (the optimal value of efficiency).


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinglong Xu ◽  
Jiajie Liu ◽  
Sabina Ampon-Wireko ◽  
Henry Asante Antwi ◽  
Lulin Zhou

Abstract Background The game of interest is the root cause of the non-cooperative competition between urban and rural medical and health institutions. The study investigates competition and cooperation among urban and rural medical institutions using the evolutionary game analysis. Methods With the evolutionary game model, analysis of the stable evolutionary strategies between the urban and rural medical and health facilities is carried out. A numerical simulation is performed to demonstrate the influence of various values. Results The result shows that the cooperation mechanism between urban and rural medical Institutions is relevant to the efficiency of rural medical institutions, government supervision, reward, and punishment mechanism. Conclusions Suggestions for utilizing the government's macro regulation and control capabilities, resolving conflicts of interest between urban and rural medical and health institutions is recommended. In addition, the study again advocates mobilizing the internal power of medical institutions' cooperation to promote collaboration between urban and rural medical and health institutions.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Ruixue Yan ◽  
Jianlin Lv ◽  
Qingshi Meng

The innovation ecosystem is a dynamic network system of competition and cooperation between entities and enterprises as the core in order to achieve value cocreation. Technology provides growth power for the innovation ecosystem, organization provides management support for the innovation ecosystem, and value has a guiding effect on the innovation ecosystem. From the perspective of technology-organization-value to study the sustainable development of the innovation ecosystem, build a system dynamics model, take the automotive industry innovation ecosystem as a research case, and find that technological elements have the most significant role in promoting innovation performance and organizational elements have a role in promoting economic benefits. Most notably, the coordinated adjustment of technological elements, organizational elements, and value elements is conducive to improving the innovation performance and economic benefits of the innovation ecosystem, and corresponding management measures are proposed from the dimensions of technology, organization, and value, which further promotes the sustainable development of the innovation ecosystem.


Author(s):  
Kebiao Yuan ◽  
Xuefeng Wang ◽  
Qiang Zhang

Aiming at the competition and cooperation decision-making problem between two ports in the same regional port group, this paper studies four kinds of dynamic game scenarios of two adjacent ports—namely, independent strategy–independent strategy (i.e., DD combinations), independent strategy–integrated strategy (i.e., DT combinations), integrated strategy–independent strategy (i.e., TD combinations), and integrated strategy–integrated strategy (i.e., TT combinations). By introducing port demand models and using the dynamic game method, the paper performs a comparative study of port service pricing, port demand, and port profit in different combinations of competition and cooperation. The results show that taking port profit as payment function, the equilibrium strategy of the leader port is the independent strategy, which is also the dominant strategy, while the independent strategy or integrated strategy of the follower port depends on the degree of service substitution provided by the two competing ports. When the degree of service substitution is low (0 < γ < 0.53), the equilibrium strategies of two competing ports are the DD combinations, but the equilibrium strategies can be improved by Pareto, and further analysis shows that TT combinations are the Pareto equilibrium strategies at this time. By contrast, when the degree of service substitution provided by the two competing ports is high (0.53 ≤γ < 1), the DT combinations are the equilibrium strategies of the two competing ports, which are also the Pareto equilibrium strategies at this time. The research shows that when the degree of service substitution of the two ports is low, to encourage the two ports to carry out differentiated development of service functions, it is conducive to promote the two ports to adopt the integrated cooperation strategies.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pankaj Mehta ◽  
Robert Marsland

Recent work suggests that cross-feeding -- the secretion and consumption of metabolic biproducts by microbes -- is essential for understanding microbial ecology. Yet how cross-feeding and competition combine to give rise to ecosystem-level properties remains poorly understood. To address this question, we analytically analyze the Microbial Consumer Resource Model (MiCRM), a prominent ecological model commonly used to study microbial communities. Our mean-field solution exploits the fact that unlike replicas, the cavity method does not require the existence of a Lyapunov function. We use our solution to derive new species-packing bounds for diverse ecosystems in the presence of cross-feeding, as well as simple expressions for species richness and the abundance of secreted resources as a function of cross-feeding (metabolic leakage) and competition. Our results show how a complex interplay between competition for resources and cooperation resulting from metabolic exchange combine to shape the properties of microbial ecosystems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Junlong Chen ◽  
Zihan Wei ◽  
Jiali Liu ◽  
Xiaosong Zheng

The existing literature has made great achievements in technology sharing (licensing patents) contracts, which has defects in the selection of oligopoly models, the setting of innovation subjects, the consideration of product heterogeneity, and production costs. This paper aims to reveal the competitiveness strategies of leaders and followers for innovation, technology sharing, and sharing fees in a Stackelberg market. The three-stage sequential game method is used to achieve the objective. The results are as follows. First, whether an enterprise uses innovation or shares technology is related to the fixed cost of innovation, the return on innovation, and product differentiation. It will hinder innovation activities if the fixed cost of innovation is too high, the return on innovation is too low, or the products are too homogeneous. A relatively low return on innovation makes it possible for the two enterprises to engage in sharing. However, with a relatively high return on innovation, only a high level of product differentiation can ensure technology sharing. Second, the optimal sharing fee is dynamic, showing an upward and then downward trend as the return on innovation grows. Product differentiation has an uncertain impact on the cost. Third, either the leader or the follower is likely to be the optimal bearer of social responsibility depending on the returns on innovation and product differentiation. This study has theoretical significance for optimizing technology-sharing decisions, improving competitiveness for enterprises, and formulating effective industrial policy for the government. And it provides some practical guidance for competition and cooperation between enterprises with technological innovation behavior.


2021 ◽  

The European Parliament (EP) has experienced an unprecedented transformation since its first direct elections in 1979 and developed into one of the most powerful legislatures in the world. It started as a talking shop assembly of legislators seconded from the national parliaments of the European Communities’ member states who met twice a year. Now it co-decides on nearly all European Union (EU) legislation, approves the EU budget together with member state governments represented by the EU Council, scrutinizes the EU executive (i.e., the European Commission), and needs to give its consent for any new international trade agreement of the EU. This spectacular evolution has stimulated prolific research on the EP’s elections, internal organization, relations with other EU institutions, and policy impact. This bibliographical review does not purport to include all the important contributions but rather offers a map of this rich scholarly work. This article summarizes EP research into four streams. First, scholars have investigated the ability of the EP election to effectively link the EU to its citizens and increase its legitimacy and accountability. Second, an extensive body of work analyzes party competition and cooperation in the EP. A related third stream of literature studies the parliamentary organization and committees. Fourth, scholars have developed elaborate theoretical models and empirical tools to investigate the power relations between the EP and other EU institutions. These debates are discussed after a brief review of major data sources used in EP studies as well as key textbooks and journal venues for research on the EP.


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