FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM FOR RESEARCHING THE COMPETITION OF TWO FIRMS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR MUTUAL AWARENESS

Исследование посвящено математическому моделированию ситуации конкурентного присутствия в рамках рыночной дуополии. Рассматривается ситуация чистой конкуренции и вариант взаимной осведомленности о стратегии конкурента. Результаты исследования имеют практическое значение для деятельности Инжинирингового центра технологий цифровой среды для обеспечения комплексной безопасности телекоммуникации, средств связи и энергоэффективности Орловского государственного университета им. И.С. Тургенева. Основные положения могут применяться при выборе стратегии поведения на рынке стратегически важных инновационных продуктов. Представленные в рамках данного исследования материалы и математическая модель, разработанные в соответствии с программой деятельности Инжинирингового центра, созданного на базе ОГУ им. И.С. Тургенева, по направлению технологий цифровой среды для обеспечения комплексной безопасности телекоммуникации, средств связи и энергоэффективности дают возможность осуществить прогнозный расчет экономически важных показателей и сопутствующих издержек в условиях конкурентного окружения. The study is devoted to mathematical modeling of the situation of competitive presence within the framework of a market duopoly. The situation of pure competition and the variant of mutual awareness of the competitor's strategy is considered. The results of the study are of practical importance for the activities of the Engineering Center for Digital Environment Technologies to ensure the integrated security of telecommunications, communications and energy efficiency of the Oryol State University. I.S. Turgenev. The main provisions can be applied when choosing a strategy of behavior in the market of strategically important innovative products. The materials and mathematical model presented in the framework of this research, developed in accordance with the program of activities of the Engineering Center, created on the basis of the OSU named after I.S. Turgenev, in the direction of digital environment technologies to ensure integrated security of telecommunications, communications and energy efficiency, make it possible to carry out a predictive calculation of economically important indicators and associated costs in a competitive environment.

Competition of higher education institutions in regional markets of educational services in Ukraine

Introduction. The system of higher education in Ukraine is an integral part of the international educational space. In terms of the number of universities (total and per capita), Ukraine is among the top 25 countries with the largest number of higher education institutions. Although Ukraine has a fairly wide network of higher education institutions, this does not mean that there is only pure competition in the regional markets of educational services. The purpose of the paper is to study the competition of higher education institutions in the regional markets of educational services in Ukraine. Results. In the article the authors study the competition of higher education institutions in the regional markets of educational services in Ukraine. Maps of competition of higher education institutions in 29 fields of knowledge in Ukraine have been constructed. For each field of knowledge, the types of competition of higher education institutions in the regional markets of educational services in Ukraine have been identified, including such as “monopoly”, “oligopoly” and “pure competition”. If there are no higher education institutions in the region that train specialists in a certain field of knowledge, then such a region was referred to as a “free niche”. Conclusion. Exceptionally pure competition of higher education institutions in the regional markets of educational services in Ukraine takes place only in the fields of knowledge 05 “Social and Behavioral Sciences” and 07 “Management and Administration”. In other fields of knowledge to some extent there are signs of oligopoly and/or monopoly of higher education institutions in the regional markets of educational services in Ukraine. There is no pure competition of higher education institutions in the regional markets of educational services in Ukraine in such fields of knowledge as 04 “Theology” and 21 “Veterinary Medicine”.

Profit Distribution Model for Construction Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Policy

Cap-and-trade has become one of the most widely used carbon emission limitation methods in the world. Its constraints have a great impact on the carbon emission reduction decisions and production operations of supply chain enterprises, as well as profit distribution. In the construction supply chain, there are few studies on the profit distribution and emission reduction decisions considering cap-and-trade policy. This paper investigates the profit distribution model of a two-echelon construction supply chain consisting of a general contractor and a subcontractor with cap-and-trade policy. Using game theory and Shapley value method, the optimal emission reduction decisions and profit distribution under three cooperation modes of pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation are obtained, respectively. The research shows that the profits of the construction supply chain are increasing in pure competition, co-opetition, and pure cooperation scenarios, and the emission reduction amount of the construction supply chain in the case of pure cooperation is greater than that of pure competition and co-opetition. The carbon emission reduction amount under the co-opetition scenario is not always greater than that under the pure competition scenario, which depends on the emission reduction cost coefficient relationship of general contractor and subcontractor. When the cost coefficient of emission reduction of the general contractor is less than that of the subcontractor, the emission reduction amount under pure competition is larger than that under co-opetition. A numerical study is carried out to verify the conclusions and illustrated the profits of the supply chain decreased with the increase of carbon emission reduction cost coefficient, and had nothing to do with the emission reduction efficiency of enterprises.

Violence, organized crime, and illicit drug markets: a Canadian case study

This article tests two inter-related theories on the situational causes of violence in illicit drug markets: (i) drug markets that are unstable are more prone to violence and (ii) there is a higher risk of instability, and hence conflict and violence, in drugmarkets characterized by pure competition. These theories are applied to the violence that occurred between the Hells Angels and its rivals over dominance in Quebec's lucrative cocaine market during the 1990s. The theory that violence stemsfrom instability in an illicit market is applicable to this case study. However, Quebec's cocaine marketwas characterized by oligopolistic conditions and the ensuing violence stemmed from the Hells Angels' efforts to maintain hegemony in that market. This paper argues that oligopolistic and monopolistic conditions in illicit drug markets may heighten the risk of conflict and violence because such conditions inhibit competition.