Dynamic Stackelberg duopoly with sticky prices and a myopic follower
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AbstractIn this paper, we study a model of a market with asymmetric information and sticky prices—the dynamic Stackelberg model with a myopic follower and infinite time horizon of Fujiwara ("Economics Bulletin" 12(12), 1–9 (2006)). We perform a comprehensive analysis of the equilibria instead of concentrating on the steady state only. We study both the equilibria for open loop and feedback information structure, which turn out to coincide, and we compare the results with the results for Cournot-Nash equilibria.
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2021 ◽
Vol 28
(4)
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2002 ◽
Vol 49
(5)
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pp. 674-679
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2013 ◽
Vol 8
(1)
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pp. 1273-1278
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