Simulation model for the coordination of environmental and economic interests

The purpose of the work is to develop a simulation model that could be used as the basis for a practical methodology for forming a ‘green’ program for the development of mining industry. For this purpose, the Stackelberg model and the apparatus of two-level mathematical programming are used and thus take into account the peculiarities of the hierarchy of interaction between the state and the private investor in the mineral resource sector. The obtained data make it possible to determine the quantitative parameters of expenditures of public financial resources, at which the target function of the state reaches its maximum. It is concluded that the strategy of choosing higher operating costs and, as a result, lower postproject environmental losses is preferable for both the state and the investor.

The Effect of Fairness Concern on Carbon Emission Reduction and Revenue Distribution in Construction Supply Chain: Power Structure Perspective

This paper invested a two-echelon construction supply chain that consists of a general contractor and a subcontractor. This paper constructs the centralized model and the decentralized models, respectively, and studies the emission reduction and revenue distribution strategies of construction supply chain considering fairness concern and cap-and-trade. Numerical analysis is carried out to analyze the influence of cap-and-trade and fairness concern on the optimal decision and the maximum profit of construction supply chain. This paper shows that, under cap-and-trade policy, the centralized model has the best emission reduction effect and the highest supply chain profit without fairness concern, while the general contractor’s Stackelberg model has the best emission reduction effect and the highest supply chain profit with fairness concern. In the two scenarios, the Vertical Nash model is the most unfavorable to emission reduction, and it will also seriously damage the interests of enterprises. In practice, supply chain should choose the general contractor’s Stackelberg model and avoid the Vertical Nash model. Because fairness concern of the subcontractor will damage the supply chain profits and emission reduction performance, the general contractor shall try to select the subcontractor with lower fairness concern to avoid the loss of profit. Besides, enterprises should actively take measures to reduce fairness concern, such as enterprises signing the contract price confidentiality clause, which aims to reduce fairness concern of the subcontractor. The results of this paper can not only enrich the research content of construction supply chain management, but also provide references for the government to formulate emission reduction policies.

Dynamic Stackelberg duopoly with sticky prices and a myopic follower

In this paper, we study a model of a market with asymmetric information and sticky prices—the dynamic Stackelberg model with a myopic follower and infinite time horizon of Fujiwara ("Economics Bulletin" 12(12), 1–9 (2006)). We perform a comprehensive analysis of the equilibria instead of concentrating on the steady state only. We study both the equilibria for open loop and feedback information structure, which turn out to coincide, and we compare the results with the results for Cournot-Nash equilibria.

A Manipulation Game Based on Machiavellian Strategies

This paper suggests a manipulation game based on Machiavellianism, which is characterized by three concepts: views, tactics, and immorality. We consider a framework where manipulating players can partially control manipulated players’ information and affect both manipulated players’ information and their allocations. The parties involved are constrained both by adverse selection and moral hazard (immorality) restricted to a class of ergodic Bayesian–Markov problems. We investigate a mechanism that maximize the probability that the manipulated players accept the proposal of the manipulators. We show that a mechanism exists and can be found by solving a nonlinear programming problem for a set of constraints. The mechanism is obtained by introducing an auxiliary variable in the nonlinear programming problem and we develop the relations needed to derive the variables of interest. For the manipulation process, players learn their behavior through a sequence of interactions in a repeated game. The manipulators possess and benefit from some commitment power, which describes the distinctive nature of a manipulation game (views). Then, we represent the game using a Stackelberg model. We also compute the Stackelberg equilibrium (tactics) for our game of incomplete information. This novel perspective is of interest for the Bayesian manipulation and persuasion literature. A simulation and analysis over an example for manipulating emotions in negotiation verify the applicability of proposed model.

A Decision-making method for the Application of Pavement Repair Materials Based on Stackelberg Model

Highway repair cost mainly depends on the toll income, which in turn is associated with the traffic volume. Scientifically making decision for the application of repair materials is within the reasonable planning of managers regarding road maintenance scale and funds. For exploring effective strategy specific to the highway maintenance plan, the paper focuses on integrating the utility factor of traveler into the highway repair decision. Relevant problems are introduced, together with the establishment of the Stackelberg model. Considering the sensitivity analysis, the heuristic algorithm is employed specific to the traffic volume N. The paper solves the decision-making model with regard to the two expressways’ maintenance plan, as well as derives corresponding strategies. At last, the paper concludes, based on analyses, the general process regarding the maintenance decisions of multiple highways with the traffic volume N, assisting highway operators in making effective decisions.

Endogenous Stackelberg leadership within a team. The coalition effect

The article engages in a theoretical investigation of the possibility of implementing the Stackelberg strategy within a team. It is assumed that the team gene-rates aggregate income that increases as the efforts invested by each agent intensify, subject to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each agent in a team is to maximize his own individual gain. In order to achieve an outcome that is Paretopreferable over Nash equilibrium, two approaches may be used: identifying a leader or forming a smaller group (coalition) within the team whose members, in pursuance of increased individual gains, choose the route that maximizes coalition gains. It is shown that the advent of a coalition in a team results in Pareto-improvement in a simultaneous game. We analyse the possibility of endogenous leadership forming according to the Stackelberg model when using the mechanism of timing decisions. It is established that under autonomy of all team members, leadership formation can only be confidently predicted in specific individual cases. In a significantly more general case, all of the prerequisites for the formation of leadership are created by the presence of a single coalition interested in implementing the Stackelberg strategy.

Analysis on the Production and Marketing Strategies of Oligopoly Companies Based on Cournot Model and Stackelberg Model

By comparing Cournot model and Stackelberg model under complete information market and Cournot model under incomplete information market, this paper analyzes the impact that manufacturer choose simultaneous or sequential games when determining the amount of output as well as the production and marketing strategy to maximize the profit of the manufacturers in the oligopoly market. A specific analysis is also conducted according to Gree air-conditioning manufacturer’s data.