scholarly journals Synchronous sampling and clock recovery of internal oscillators for side channel analysis and fault injection

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin O’Flynn ◽  
Zhizhang Chen
10.29007/fv2n ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Cheng ◽  
Claude Carlet ◽  
Kouassi Goli ◽  
Jean-Luc Danger ◽  
Sylvain Guilley

Side-channel analysis and fault injection attacks are two typical threats to cryptographic implementations, especially in modern embedded devices. Thus there is an insistent demand for dual side-channel and fault injection protections. As it is known, masking scheme is a kind of provable countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Recently, inner product masking (IPM) was proposed as a promising higher-order masking scheme against side-channel analysis, but not for fault injection attacks. In this paper, we devise a new masking scheme named IPM-FD. It is built on IPM, which enables fault detection. This novel masking scheme has three properties: the security orders in the word-level probing model, bit-level probing model, and the number of detected faults. IPM-FD is proven secure both in the word-level and in the bit-level probing models, and allows for end-to-end fault detection against fault injection attacks.Furthermore, we illustrate its security order by linking it to one defining parameters of linear code, and show its implementation cost by applying IPM-FD to AES-128.


Author(s):  
Takuji Miki ◽  
Makoto Nagata

Abstract Cryptographic ICs on edge devices for internet-of-things (IoT) applications are exposed to an adversary and threatened by malicious side channel analysis. On-chip analog monitoring by sensor circuits embedded inside the chips is one of the possible countermeasures against such attacks. An on-chip monitor circuit consisting of a successive approximation register (SAR) analog-to-digital converter (ADC) and an input buffer acquires a wideband signal, which enables to detects an irregular noise due to an active fault injection and a passive side channel leakage analysis. In this paper, several countermeasures against security attacks utilizing wideband on-chip monitors are reviewed. Each technique is implemented on a prototype chip, and the measurement results prove they can effectively detect and diagnose the security attacks.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document