Human engineering guide for enhancing nuclear control rooms

1987 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-169
1981 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-12
Author(s):  
Steven M. Pine

The accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) has underscored the need for human factors review and analysis of Nuclear Control Rooms. Virtually every study of the TMI debacle has come to the conclusion that one of the major contributors of the accident was poor human engineering. In recognition of this fact, the nuclear industry, through its research institutes, has initiated a series of research programs designed to provide individual utilities with guidelines on how to apply human factors principles and criteria to improve the safety and performance of their nuclear facilities. The present paper reports on one of the major studies being undertaken by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in the area. The objective of this research project is to identify and prioritize the existing Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) in nuclear control rooms and to develop retrofits for correcting these HEDs that can be implemented during normal plant operation or during planned outages. Data was collected during one week visits to five power plants. Structured interviews, checklists, task analyses, surveys (noise, light, etc.) and procedural walk-throughs/talk-throughs were employed to assess the design and layout of the control rooms. In depth analyses of these data led to the identification of numerous HEDs. A prioritization scheme was developed to determine the relative seriousness of these HEDs and to rank alternative retrofit solutions in terms of cost and feasibility. The results revealed fairly wide variance in the extent to which control rooms violate human factors principles. The most frequent areas in which violations were found are labeling, alarm/display systems, functional grouping, design conventions, and anthropometric limits. Numerous HEDs along with alternative retrofits are shown and discussed. Emphasis is given to cost and engineering consideration in selecting appropriate backfits.


Author(s):  
Roger Lew ◽  
Ronald L. Boring ◽  
Thomas A. Ulrich

The United States (U.S.) has 99 operating Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). The majority of these were designed and commissioned in the 1970s and 1980s. Plants are modernizing their control systems and main control rooms to be able to continue operating past their original 40-year license agreements. U.S. NPP main control rooms are migrating towards hybrid controls with both digital and analog systems. Digital upgrades, while costly, provide improved reliability, reduced maintenance cost, and the potential for fewer unplanned outages and fewer human errors. U.S. utilities have been slow to embrace computerized procedure system (CBP) research, even though CBPs demonstrate clear operational and human factors benefits. Most of the CBP research has been oriented to new reactor designs or full digital control rooms and is not applicable to the piecemeal modernization approach favored by U.S. plants. Research is needed to examine how CBPs impact operations in hybrid control rooms, and how current paper based procedures can be efficiently migrated to computerized platforms. Work is underway to develop tools and perform the obligatory research needed to design and validate CBPs for modernized U.S. nuclear control rooms.


1980 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-270
Author(s):  
Clifford C. Baker ◽  
Robin West ◽  
Kenneth M. Mallory

As part of an effort to develop human engineerging guidelines and a methodology for the evaluation of nuclear power plant control room operability, the Essex Corporation conducted T & E (test and evaluation) reviews of a wide sample of nuclear power plant control rooms. The objectives of these design reviews were: 1) selection, application, and development of human engineering evaluation guidelines applicable to the nuclear power industry; 2) selection and development of data collection and analysis procedures; and 3) identification of recurrent human engineering design problems in the control rooms of currently operating nuclear power plants. The present paper discusses the approach taken and the findings in item three above. Thirteen control rooms were visited, and guidelines and data collection methods under various degrees of development were applied. Following control room visits, data were analyzed according to usability, number of incidences of similar or identical operability design problems, criticality of problems with respect to both public and plant safety, and subjective assessment of operational affects due to human engineering problems in design. Results to date show that the following areas have recurrent operability design problems: layout of controls and displays according to either operational or functional use; coding of information for visual and auditory presentation; job performance aid and procedures design; communications; environmental factors such as ambient noise; violations in control and display conventions employed; use of conventions which violate population stereotypes; and failure to design within anthropometric constraints. Further work is being conducted by Essex Corporation to identify critical human engineering deficiencies in control room design and to select adequate yet cost-effective and corrective backfits.


1980 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-275
Author(s):  
Kenneth M. Mailory ◽  
Clifford C. Baker ◽  
Robin K. West

Few human engineering standards or criteria for the design of nuclear power plant control rooms existed prior to the accident at Three Mile Island — Unit 2. For the most part control room design was dictated by electrical criteria, costs, and, most importantly, by precedent evolved from fossil fuel plant experience. Since the TMI-2 accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has undertaken an ambitious program to develop control room design and operational guidelines to be used by utilities in evaluating the human engineering fitness of control rooms and in identifying human engineering problems requiring backfit. The following paper reviews the method used to develop control room guidelines, the process suggested to the utilities for performing control room evaluations, and sources for and the content of guidelines. As reported in the paper, evaluation guidelines evolved from a basic set of military standards and checklists through a series of on-site control room reviews. The methods used in these reviews involve surveys, checklists, and videotaped walk-throughs of emergency procedures. The final product is a Guidebook containing: (a) procedures for scheduling, planning, administration, and staffing of human engineering reviews; (b) the evaluation procedures to be used, including guidelines, human engineering data, references, and methods; (c) a trade-off process for sorting out problems needing immediate vs. more remote attention; and (d) suggestions for backfits for the human engineering problems most widespread in the industry.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 408-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean William Kortschot ◽  
Greg A. Jamieson ◽  
Cole Wheeler

1982 ◽  
Vol 26 (8) ◽  
pp. 727-730
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Schulz ◽  
Steven M. Pine

The practicing human factors engineer is often called upon to help in improving a system which has already been designed, built and placed into operation. The authors' organization has recently completed a major program to develop guidelines for enhancing nuclear power plant control rooms. On the basis of this and other experiences, an outline for the process of enhancing a system has been developed. This paper will discuss elements of this process which lead to a comprehensive and systematic approach to improvement.


Ergonomics ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (8) ◽  
pp. 1158-1172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yue Chen ◽  
Qin Gao ◽  
Fei Song ◽  
Zhizhong Li ◽  
Yufan Wang

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