scholarly journals Risk-based capital and deposit insurance reform

1991 ◽  
Vol 15 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 847-874 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert B. Avery ◽  
Allen N. Berger
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Insurance Reform

Deposit insurance reform: What are the issues and what needs to be fixed?

1991 ◽  
Vol 15 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 735-752 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Berlin ◽  
Anthony Saunders ◽  
Gregory F. Udell
Keyword(s):  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Insurance Reform

scholarly journals FDICIA After Five Years

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
George J Benston ◽  
George G Kaufman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Deposit Insurance ◽  
Market Discipline ◽  
Agent Behavior ◽  
Depository Institutions ◽  
Incentive Compatible ◽  
Insurance Reform ◽  
Early Results ◽  
Incentive Incompatibility

At year-end 1991, Congress enacted fundamental deposit insurance reform for banks and thrifts--the FDIC Improvement Act. This reform followed the failure of more than 2,000 depository institutions in the 1980s. Many failed because the incentive incompatibility of the structure of federal government-provided deposit insurance encouraged moral hazard behavior by banks and poor agent behavior by regulators. Insurance was put on a more incentive compatible basis, providing for a graduated series of sanctions mimicking market discipline that first may and then must be applied by the regulators on floundering banks. This article reviews these changes and evaluates early results.

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