A distinction between Cartesian knowers (who are capable of all forms of metacognition) and ground-floor cognizers are drawn. B.B., a virtual ground-floor cognizer, is extensively described: what it knows, what it doesn’t know, and what concepts can be attributed to it. The fragmented nature of iterated cognitions is described. That deduction need not require metacognitions of any sort is described: in successfully deducing q from p, an agent need not recognize or appreciate that she is using propositions, that she is using a rule (modus ponens), or that she is justified. A psychological study of deduction is described, and how it fails to illustrate metacognition is illustrated. The apparent ineffability of metacognition in nonhuman animals is discussed. A single anecdotal case of metacognition in chimpanzees is given, and an implicit knowledge generalization is attributed to the animals on the basis of this case. The use of Morgan’s canon is rejected.
Reading Morgan's Canon: Reduction and Unification in the Forging of a Science of the Mind