Imagination inflation in the mirror: Can imagining others' actions induce false memories of self-performance?

2015 ◽  
Vol 158 ◽  
pp. 51-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabel Lindner ◽  
Gerald Echterhoff
2010 ◽  
Vol 179 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Mammarella ◽  
Mario Altamura ◽  
Flavia A. Padalino ◽  
Annamaria Petito ◽  
Beth Fairfield ◽  
...  

2000 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryanne Garry ◽  
Devon L.L. Polaschek

A growing body of literature shows that imagining contrary-to-truth experiences can change memory. Recent experiments are reviewed to show that when people think about or imagine a false event, entire false memories can be implanted. Imagination inflation can occur even when there is no overt social pressure, and when hypothetical events are imagined only briefly. Overall, studies of imagination inflation show that imagining a counter-factual event can make subjects more confident that it actually occurred. We discuss possible mechanisms for imagination inflation and find that, with evidence supporting the involvement of both source confusion and familiarity in creating inflation, the primary mechanism is still to be determined. We briefly review evidence on individual differences in susceptibility to inflation. Finally, the widespread use of imagination-based techniques in self-help and clinical contexts suggests that there may be practical implications when imagination is used as a therapeutic tool.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
María J. Maraver ◽  
Ana Lapa ◽  
Leonel Garcia-Marques ◽  
Paula Carneiro ◽  
Ana Raposo

Human memory can be unreliable, and when reading a sentence with a pragmatic implication, such as “the karate champion hit the cinder block,” people often falsely remember that the karate champion “broke” the cinder block. Yet, research has shown that encoding instructions affect the false memories we form. On the one hand, instructing participants to imagine themselves manipulating the to-be-recalled items increase false memories (imagination inflation effect). But on the other hand, instructions to imagine have reduced false memories in the DRM paradigm (imagination facilitation effect). Here, we explored the effect of imaginal encoding with pragmatic inferences, a way to study false memories for information about everyday actions. Across two experiments, we manipulated imaginal encoding through the instructions given to participants and the after-item filler task (none vs. math operations). In Experiment 1, participants were either assigned to the encoding condition of imagine+no filler; pay attention+math; or memorize+math. In Experiment 2, the encoding instructions (imagine vs. memorize) and the filler task (none vs. math) were compared across four separate conditions. Results from the two experiments showed that imagination instructions lead to better memory, by showing a higher proportion of correct responses and better performance in a memory benefit index. Similarly, a significant reduction of false memories was observed across both experiments, even though a complementary Bayesian analysis only supported this conclusion for Experiment 1. The findings show that imaginal encoding improves memory, suggesting the engagement of a distinctiveness heuristic and source-monitoring process.


Author(s):  
Matthew P. Gerrie ◽  
Maryanne Garry

When people see movies with some parts missing, they falsely recognize many of the missing parts later. In two experiments, we examined the effect of warnings on people’s false memories for these parts. In Experiment 1, warning subjects about false recognition before the movie (forewarnings) reduced false recognition, but warning them after the movie (postwarnings) reduced false recognition to a lesser extent. In Experiment 2, the effect of the warnings depended on the nature of the missing parts. Forewarnings were more effective than postwarnings in reducing false recognition of missing noncrucial parts, but forewarnings and postwarnings were similarly effective in reducing false recognition of crucial missing parts. We use the source monitoring framework to explain our results.


Author(s):  
Stefanie J. Sharman ◽  
Samantha Calacouris

People are motivated to remember past autobiographical experiences related to their current goals; we investigated whether people are also motivated to remember false past experiences related to those goals. In Session 1, we measured subjects’ implicit and explicit achievement and affiliation motives. Subjects then rated their confidence about, and memory for, childhood events containing achievement and affiliation themes. Two weeks later in Session 2, subjects received a “computer-generated profile” based on their Session 1 ratings. This profile suggested that one false achievement event and one false affiliation event had happened in childhood. After imagining and describing the suggested false events, subjects made confidence and memory ratings a second time. For achievement events, subjects’ explicit motives predicted their false beliefs and memories. The results are explained using source monitoring and a motivational model of autobiographical memory.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dustin P. Calvillo ◽  
Angelina N. Vasquez ◽  
Amanda Pesavento

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