scholarly journals Buy me a river: Use of multi-attribute non-linear utility functions to address overcompensation in agricultural water buyback

2017 ◽  
Vol 190 ◽  
pp. 6-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.D. Pérez-Blanco ◽  
C. Gutiérrez-Martín
2003 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 493-500
Author(s):  
Shoichiro NAKAYAMA ◽  
Jun-ichi TAKAYAMA ◽  
Yuichiro YAMASHITA

1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fung-Yee Chan ◽  
Hans U. Gerber

AbstractThe reinsurer has a monopoly in the following sense: He will select a random variable P that determines the reinsurance premiums. The first insurer can purchase a payment of R (a random variable) for a premium of π = E[PR]. For known P, the first insurer chooses R to maximize his expected utility. Knowing this, i.e., the demand for reinsurance as a function of P, the reinsurer chooses P to maximize his utility. The resulting pair (P, R) is called the Bowley solution. Assuming exponential, quadratic and/or linear utility functions, some explicit results are obtained.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 1697-1720 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiangrong Tong ◽  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Houkuan Huang

To date, researches on agent multi-issue negotiation are mostly based on linear utility functions. However, the relationship between utilities and resources is usually saturated nonlinear. To this end, we expand linear utility functions to nonlinear cases according to the law of diminishing marginal utility. Furthermore, we propose a negotiation model on multiple divisible resources with two phases to realize Pareto optimal results. The computational complexity of the proposed algorithm is polynomial order. Experimental results show that the optimized efficiency of the proposed algorithm is distinctly higher than prior work.


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