Pay-as-You-Go Social Security and Educational Subsidy in an Overlapping Generations Model with Endogenous Fertility and Endogenous Retirement

This study analytically investigates the effects of pay-as-you-go social security and educational subsidies on the fertility rate, retirement age, and GDP per capita growth rate in an overlapping generations model, where parents invest resources toward their children’s human capital. We find that an old agent retires fully when his or her labor productivity is low and retires later when the labor productivity is high. Under the unique balanced-growth-path (BGP) equilibrium, when an old agent is still engaged in work, tax rates are neutral to the fertility rate, higher tax rates encourage him or her to retire earlier, a higher social security tax rate depresses the GDP per capita growth rate, and a higher tax rate for educational subsidies can accelerate growth. However, when an old agent fully retires, higher tax rates increase the fertility rate, a higher social security tax rate lowers the GDP per capita growth rate, and a higher tax rate for educational subsidies boosts growth. Additionally, if an old agent’s labor productivity increases, the fertility rate also increases. We also conduct numerical simulations and analyze how an old agent’s labor productivity affects the retirement age, fertility rate, and GDP per capita growth rate under the BGP equilibrium.

POSTPONING RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY IN A TWO-SECTOR MODEL

Pay-as-you-go social security schemes in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries are facing solvency problems, as people are living longer and birth rates have declined. Postponing the full retirement age (FRA), when retirees are entitled to full pension, has been proposed as a solution. This effectively lowers the payroll tax rate since pension is paid only in the post-FRA period. In a two-period two-sector overlapping generations model, I show that this shift lowers savings (because a part of the expected old-age income is consumed in the first period), as employment increases. In the transition to the new steady state, capital is decumulated and the wage rate falls. Contrast this with a reduction of the payroll tax rate where the initial old suffer reduced consumption, but the young have higher post-tax income and this spurs capital accumulation.

Business Cycles in a Two-Sided Altruism Model

This study demonstrates that business cycles with complex periodic fluctuations may arise in an overlapping generations model with two-sided altruism. The structure of an equilibrium dynamical system strongly depends on the degree of altruism in the model. If either altruism of a generation to the parent or the child disappears, the study also demonstrates that complex periodic fluctuations never occur. In this sense, two-sided altruism is essential for a complex business cycle.

Involuntary Unemployment as a Nash Equilibrium and Fiscal Policy for Full Employment

This study aimed to provide a game-theoretic interpretation of the analyses of involuntary unemployment by deficiency of aggregate demand and fiscal policy to achieve full employment using an overlapping generations model. We showed that involuntary unemployment is in a Nash equilibrium of a game with a firm and consumers. Moreover, we showed that full employment can be achieved through fiscal policies that create budget deficits in recessionary conditions with involuntary unemployment. Once full employment is achieved, it can be sustained without a budget deficit.

Pension Reforms, Population Aging, and Retirement Decision of the Elderly in a Neoclassical Growth Model

This study explores the linkage between the labor force participation of the elderly and the long-run performance of the economy in the context of a two-period-lived overlapping generations model. We assume that the old agents are heterogeneous in their labor efficiency and they continue working if their income exceeds the pension that can be received in the case of full retirement. We first inspect the key factors that determine the retirement decision of the elderly. We then examine analytically as well as numerically the long-run impact of labor participation of the elderly on capital accumulation and income distribution.

Supply-side Effects of Pandemic Mortality: Insights from an Overlapping-generations Model

We use an overlapping-generations model to explore the implications of mortality during pandemics for the economy’s productive capacity. Under current epidemiological projections for the progression of COVID-19, our model suggests that mortality will have, in itself, only small effects on output and factor prices because projected mortality is small in proportion to the population and skewed toward individuals who are retired from the labor force. That said, we show that if the spread of COVID-19 is not contained, or if the ongoing pandemic were to follow a mortality pattern similar to the 1918–1920 Great Influenza pandemic, then the effects on the productive capacity would be economically significant and persist for decades.

The effects of financing rules in pay-as-you-go pension systems on the life and the business cycle

Empirically, revenues of public pension systems are more volatile than expenditures. Therefore, the question arises how the social security authority should buffer its revenues and adjust its contributions over the business cycle. This paper studies the corresponding effects on the life cycle of households and the business cycle in a large-scale overlapping generations model. In particular, the labor supply is endogenous and takes the intertemporal links between contributions and pension benefits into account. Sluggish adjustments of contribution rates that are implemented by adjusting a financial buffer stock both stabilize an economy and decrease the volatility of lifetime utilities of most workers and retirees, in contrast to sole adjustments of contribution rates. However, changes of consumption, capital income, or lump sum taxes, which aim to balance public pension budgets, improve the allocation of aggregate risk across cohorts for people up to an age of at least 71 years.