Dynamics of a Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality based on relative profit maximization

2017 ◽  
Vol 294 ◽  
pp. 253-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.A. Elsadany
Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
S. S. Askar

The comparison between two nonlinear duopoly models constructed based on symmetric utility function that is derived from Cobb–Douglas is investigated in this paper. The first model consists of two firms which update their outputs using gradient-based mechanism called bounded rationality. The second model contains a bounded rational firm that is competing with a firm whose outputs depend on a trade-off between market share maximization and profit maximization. For the two models, the fixed points are calculated and their conditions of stability are analyzed. The obtained results show that the second model is more stabilizing provided that the second firm adopts low weights of trade-offs. We show that the two models can be destabilized via flip bifurcation only. Furthermore, the noninvertibility of the two models that can give rise to several stable attractors is discussed.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
S. S. Askar ◽  
A. Ibrahim ◽  
A. A. Elsadany

A Cournot duopoly game is a two-firm market where the aim is to maximize profits. It is rational for every company to maximize its profits with minimal sales constraints. As a consequence, a model of constrained profit maximization (CPM) occurs when a business needs to be increased with profit minimal sales constraints. The CPM model, in which companies maximize profits under the minimum sales constraints, is an alternative to the profit maximization model. The current study constructs a duopoly game based on an isoelastic demand and homogeneous goods with heterogeneous strategies. In the event of sales constraint and no sales constraint, the local stability conditions of the Cournot equilibrium are derived. The initial results show that the duopoly model would be easier to stabilize if firms were to impose certain minimum sales constraints. Two routes to chaos are analyzed by numerical simulation using 2D bifurcation diagram, one of which is period doubling bifurcation and the other is Neimark–Sacker bifurcation. Four forms of coexistence of attractors are demonstrated by the basin of attraction, which is the coexistence of periodic attractors and chaotic attractors, the coexistence of periodic attractors and quasiperiodic attractors, and the coexistence of several chaotic attractors. Our findings show that the effect of game parameters on stability depends on the rules of expectations and restriction of sales by firms.


2012 ◽  
Vol 45 (12) ◽  
pp. 1469-1478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Luca Gori ◽  
Mauro Sodini

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