scholarly journals The Fan minimax inequality implies the Nash equilibrium theorem

2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (12) ◽  
pp. 2206-2210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sehie Park
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Minimax Inequality ◽  
Equilibrium Theorem

scholarly journals Fixed point theorems in minimal generalized convex spaces

Filomat ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 165-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rahmat Darzi ◽  
Rostamian Delavar ◽  
Mehdi Roohi
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Point ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Fixed Point Theorem ◽  
Fixed Point Theorems ◽  
Coincidence Point ◽  
Kkm Principle ◽  
Generalized Convex Space ◽  
Ky Fan ◽  
Equilibrium Theorem ◽  
Convex Spaces

This paper deals with coincidence and fixed point theorems in minimal generalized convex spaces. By establishing a kind of KKM Principle in minimal generalized convex space, we obtain some results on coincidence point and fixed point theorems. Generalized versions of Ky Fan?s lemma, Fan-Browder fixed point theorem, Nash equilibrium theorem and some Urai?s type fixed point theorems in minimal generalized convex spaces are given.

Analysis on Cournot Oligopoly Game Models With Two Firms and More Than Two Firms

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Cournot Equilibrium ◽  
Cournot Game ◽  
Existence Conditions ◽  
Equilibrium Theorem

This paper reviews the standard game models and its Nash equilibrium and then analyses Cournot oligopoly game from two firms to the case with more than two firms. Due to Cournot equilibrium point, the concept of Cournot equilibrium point is the same as the concept as the non-cooperative game with pure strategy but the strategy can be chosen in Cournot game is infinity and it can not be obtained base on Nash equilibrium theorem. Finally, the existence conditions of Cournot equilibrium point are given and the theorem and its proof of the existence Cournot equilibrium point are given too.

A generalization of the Nash equilibrium theorem on bimatrix games

1996 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Seetharama Gowda ◽  
Roman Sznajder
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Bimatrix Games ◽  
Equilibrium Theorem

A Theory of Patronized Goods: Inefficient and Efficient Equilibria

2011 ◽  
pp. 65-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Policy ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Pareto Optimal ◽  
Market Failures ◽  
Equilibrium Conditions ◽  
Policy Issues

The article considers some aspects of the patronized goods theory with respect to efficient and inefficient equilibria. The author analyzes specific features of patronized goods as well as their connection with market failures, and conjectures that they are related to the emergence of Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibria. The key problem is the analysis of the opportunities for transforming inefficient Nash equilibrium into Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium for patronized goods by modifying the institutional environment. The paper analyzes social motivation for institutional modernization and equilibrium conditions in the generalized Wicksell-Lindahl model for patronized goods. The author also considers some applications of patronized goods theory to social policy issues.

scholarly journals Expressiveness and Nash Equilibrium in Iterated Boolean Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
Julian Gutierrez ◽  
Paul Harrenstein ◽  
Giuseppe Perelli ◽  
Michael Wooldridge
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Infinite Sequence ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Temporal Logics ◽  
Agent Systems ◽  
Temporal Properties ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Boolean Games

We define and investigate a novel notion of expressiveness for temporal logics that is based on game theoretic equilibria of multi-agent systems. We use iterated Boolean games as our abstract model of multi-agent systems [Gutierrez et al. 2013, 2015a]. In such a game, each agent  has a goal  , represented using (a fragment of) Linear Temporal Logic ( ) . The goal  captures agent  ’s preferences, in the sense that the models of  represent system behaviours that would satisfy  . Each player controls a subset of Boolean variables , and at each round in the game, player is at liberty to choose values for variables in any way that she sees fit. Play continues for an infinite sequence of rounds, and so as players act they collectively trace out a model for , which for every player will either satisfy or fail to satisfy their goal. Players are assumed to act strategically, taking into account the goals of other players, in an attempt to bring about computations satisfying their goal. In this setting, we apply the standard game-theoretic concept of (pure) Nash equilibria. The (possibly empty) set of Nash equilibria of an iterated Boolean game can be understood as inducing a set of computations, each computation representing one way the system could evolve if players chose strategies that together constitute a Nash equilibrium. Such a set of equilibrium computations expresses a temporal property—which may or may not be expressible within a particular fragment. The new notion of expressiveness that we formally define and investigate is then as follows: What temporal properties are characterised by the Nash equilibria of games in which agent goals are expressed in specific fragments of  ? We formally define and investigate this notion of expressiveness for a range of fragments. For example, a very natural question is the following: Suppose we have an iterated Boolean game in which every goal is represented using a particular fragment of : is it then always the case that the equilibria of the game can be characterised within ? We show that this is not true in general.

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