Linear–quadratic mean field stochastic zero-sum differential games

Automatica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 120 ◽  
pp. 109067 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Moon
Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 1669
Author(s):  
Jun Moon ◽  
Wonhee Kim

We consider the indefinite, linear-quadratic, mean-field-type stochastic zero-sum differential game for jump-diffusion models (I-LQ-MF-SZSDG-JD). Specifically, there are two players in the I-LQ-MF-SZSDG-JD, where Player 1 minimizes the objective functional, while Player 2 maximizes the same objective functional. In the I-LQ-MF-SZSDG-JD, the jump-diffusion-type state dynamics controlled by the two players and the objective functional include the mean-field variables, i.e., the expected values of state and control variables, and the parameters of the objective functional do not need to be (positive) definite matrices. These general settings of the I-LQ-MF-SZSDG-JD make the problem challenging, compared with the existing literature. By considering the interaction between two players and using the completion of the squares approach, we obtain the explicit feedback Nash equilibrium, which is linear in state and its expected value, and expressed as the coupled integro-Riccati differential equations (CIRDEs). Note that the interaction between the players is analyzed via a class of nonanticipative strategies and the “ordered interchangeability” property of multiple Nash equilibria in zero-sum games. We obtain explicit conditions to obtain the Nash equilibrium in terms of the CIRDEs. We also discuss the different solvability conditions of the CIRDEs, which lead to characterization of the Nash equilibrium for the I-LQ-MF-SZSDG-JD. Finally, our results are applied to the mean-field-type stochastic mean-variance differential game, for which the explicit Nash equilibrium is obtained and the simulation results are provided.


2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (12) ◽  
pp. 5089-5098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Barreiro-Gomez ◽  
Tyrone E. Duncan ◽  
Hamidou Tembine

1981 ◽  
Vol 103 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-38
Author(s):  
C. T. Leondes ◽  
T. K. Sui

Both maximizing and minimizing players are concerned with the change in payoff due to small variation of system parameters. A technique is developed to derive linear algebraic matrix equations which can be used to determine the payoff sensitivity of all the parameters in linear zero- sum differential games with constant feedback. Above all, this technique is applicable for determining both the optimal strategy and payoff.


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