Judgments of learning do not reduce to memory encoding operations: Event-related potential evidence for distinct metacognitive processes

2010 ◽  
Vol 1318 ◽  
pp. 87-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ida-Maria Skavhaug ◽  
Edward L. Wilding ◽  
David I. Donaldson
NeuroImage ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 98 ◽  
pp. 475-486 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Lenk ◽  
Annet Bluschke ◽  
Christian Beste ◽  
Emilia Iannilli ◽  
Veit Rößner ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kit S Double ◽  
Damian P. Birney

Metacognition is typically measured by collecting self-reported information from participants while they complete a cognitive task. Recent evidence suggests that eliciting such metacognitive information from participants can impact both their metacognitive processes and their cognitive performance. Although there are contradictory findings regarding the magnitude and even the direction of this effect, recent evidence has converged to provide a clearer picture of the mechanisms that determine reactivity. Here, we provide a review of the evidence that measures of metacognition, namely think-aloud protocols, judgments of learning, and confidence ratings, are reactive. We argue that reactivity has important implications not just for the measurement of metacognition, but for metacognition theorizing because reactivity can provide insights into the cues participants use to monitor their performance. Drawing from this synthesis of evidence, we propose a framework for studying reactivity that integrates cue processing accounts of reactivity with existing models of metacognition. We conclude the review by addressing some of the pertinent questions yet to be comprehensively addressed by reactivity research, including how researchers should best address issues of reactivity when using experimental designs.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 ◽  
pp. 142-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enguo Wang ◽  
Shutao Qin ◽  
MengYan Chang ◽  
Xiangru Zhu

2010 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. e182-e183
Author(s):  
Ayumi Sashi ◽  
Naoyuki Emata ◽  
Satoshi Fujii ◽  
Takeshi Aihara ◽  
Hiroshi Sasaki

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Brydges ◽  
Andrew Gordon ◽  
Ullrich K. H. Ecker

A plethora of behavioural research has suggested that the successful encoding of retracting information is required to minimise the lingering effects of misinformation. However, neuroscientific research in this area is much scarcer. Participants (n = 34) completed a typical continued-influence misinformation paradigm whilst electroencephalographic data were recorded. Two event-related potential (ERP) components associated with memory encoding and updating (a left-frontal positivity and the parietal P3b) were examined when participants processed misinformation retractions in comparison to when no misinformation was presented. Neither frequentist nor Bayesian analyses found differences between ERP amplitudes elicited by retractions and non-retractions. It is plausible that misinformation removal and the integration of corrective information are not temporally reliable across trials, resulting in suppressed amplitude in the ERP. Nonetheless, the high temporal resolution of ERPs may still be able to provide an informative perspective on the neural processes of misinformation processing in future research.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph M. Saito ◽  
Matthew Kolisnyk ◽  
Keisuke Fukuda

Despite the massive capacity of visual long-term memory, individuals do not successfully encode all visual information they wish to remember. This variability in encoding success has been traditionally ascribed to fluctuations in individuals’ cognitive states (e.g., sustained attention) and differences in memory encoding processes (e.g., depth of encoding). However, recent work has shown that a considerable amount of variability in encoding success stems from intrinsic stimulus properties that determine the ease of encoding across individuals. While researchers have identified several perceptual and semantic properties that contribute to this stimulus memorability phenomenon, much remains unknown, including whether individuals are aware of the memorability of stimuli they encounter. In the present study, we investigated whether individuals have conscious access to the memorability of real-world stimuli while forming self-referential judgments of learning (JOL) during explicit memory encoding (Experiments 1A-B) and when asked about the perceived memorability of a stimulus in the absence of attempted encoding (Experiments 2A-B). We found that both JOLs and perceived memorability estimates were consistent across individuals and reliably predicted stimulus memorability. However, this apparent access to the properties that define memorability was not comprehensive. Individuals unexpectedly remembered and forgot consistent sets of stimuli as well. Thus, our findings demonstrate that individuals have conscious access to some—but not all—aspects of stimulus memorability and that this access exists regardless of the present demands on stimulus encoding.


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