Dynamic game strategies of a two-stage remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain considering Big Data marketing, technological innovation and overconfidence

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier is considered. The capacity of the manufacturer is limited, the manufacturer can increase capacity by investing in capacity, and there are different cooperation contracts among the supply chain members. This paper pushes collecting activities upstream, assumes that the collecting activity can be completed by the supplier, and accepts that there is cooperation between the members, which increases supplier involvement. Dynamic game models among CLSC members are formulated. The optimal decisions of pricing, capacity investment, and collecting channels of the CLSC members are obtained, and the impacts of some important factors, for example, the capacity investment cost coefficient and the cost-sharing factors, on optimal decisions are investigated. The results reveal that the supplier collecting mode performs better in some scenarios; therefore, the management enlightenment desired by the supplier can be obtained. Additionally, the coordination between the manufacturer and the supplier sometimes fails to increase the closed-loop supply chain’s sustainability, which is a finding quite different from some current research results.

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On risk management of a two-stage stochastic mixed 0–1 model for the closed-loop supply chain design problem

European Journal of Operational Research ◽

10.1016/j.ejor.2018.09.041 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 274 (1) ◽

pp. 91-107 ◽

Cited By ~ 18

Author(s):

Susana Baptista ◽

Ana Paula Barbosa-Póvoa ◽

Laureano F. Escudero ◽

Maria Isabel Gomes ◽

Celeste Pizarro

Keyword(s):

Risk Management ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Design Problem ◽

Closed Loop ◽

Supply Chain Design ◽

Two Stage ◽

Closed Loop Supply Chain

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Research on Collaborative Management Strategies of Closed-Loop Supply Chain under the Influence of Big-Data Marketing and Reference Price Effect

Sustainability ◽

10.3390/su12041685 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 12 (4) ◽

pp. 1685

Author(s):

Deqing Ma ◽

Jinsong Hu

Keyword(s):

Big Data ◽

Supply Chain ◽

Reference Price ◽

Business Models ◽

Closed Loop ◽

Price Effect ◽

Bottom Line ◽

Service Platform ◽

Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽

Internet Service

This paper integrates the Internet service platform with big-data marketing into the dynamic closed-loop supply chain system as an independent game subject. Considering the reference price effect of consumers, this work constructs differential games among manufacturer, retailer and Internet service platform under three business models of independent, collaborative production and collaborative marketing. Using Bellman’s continuous dynamic programming theory, this work obtains the optimal feedback strategies of price and big-data marketing effort, brand goodwill, return rate of used products and corporate profits under the three business models. Comparing the three scenarios and analyzing the sensitivity of key exogenous parameters, it can be found that the involvement of Internet service platform has a crucial impact on the sustainable profitability of supply chain enterprises. Considering the reference price effect of consumers, enterprises should adopt different strategic alliances in different periods, which can also gain new development momentum in the context of data-driven marketing, achieve the improvement of the triple-bottom line of closed-loop supply chain and even reach a win-win situation for supply chain enterprises.

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