The role of retailer’s performance in optimal wholesale price discount policies

Igor Bykadorov; Andrea Ellero; Elena Moretti; Silvia Vianello

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2007.12.008

Turning Discounts Into Profits: Factors Influencing Online Purchasing Decisions for Hotel Add-on Items

Cornell Hospitality Quarterly ◽

10.1177/1938965520935397 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 193896552093539 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Esther L. Kim ◽

Sarah Tanford

Keyword(s):

Process Model ◽

Mental Accounting ◽

Thinking Styles ◽

Impulse Buying ◽

Purchasing Decisions ◽

Price Discount ◽

Mediating Role ◽

Factors Influencing ◽

Impulse Buying Tendency

A hotel website exclusive discount is widely adopted by major chain hotels to increase the volume of direct bookings. Although the traditional purpose of a discount promotion is to attract customers to the business, this research suggests that a hotel website exclusive price discount can induce consumers’ additional spending. Principles of mental accounting and two thinking styles (analytic vs. holistic) predict different effects of a price discount and the add-on product type by individual thinking styles. A quasi-experiment investigated the effect of an unexpected discount, relatedness of add-on item to a hotel stay, and individual thinking styles on add-on purchasing. The mediating role of impulse buying was subsequently examined using the PROCESS model. The effect of a price discount and the relatedness of add-on item are significant for analytic thinkers, whereas holistic thinkers report higher likelihood to purchase add-on items regardless of relatedness. Holistic thinkers’ likelihood to purchase is enhanced through an impulse buying tendency. The findings provide further evidence for the role of individual differences in response to pricing tactics by suggesting that a price promotion increases add-on purchases for analytic thinkers, whereas promoting a sense of impulsiveness can be more effective for holistic thinkers.

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Returns with wholesale-price-discount contract in a newsvendor problem

International Journal of Production Economics ◽

10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.11.025 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 130 (1) ◽

pp. 104-111 ◽

Cited By ~ 49

Author(s):

Jing Chen

Keyword(s):

Wholesale Price ◽

Newsvendor Problem ◽

Price Discount

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Supplier's cooperation strategy with two competing manufacturers under wholesale price discount contract considering technology investment

10.21203/rs.3.rs-411779/v1 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Shanxue Yang ◽

Hongwei Liu ◽

Guoli Wang ◽

Yifei Hao

Keyword(s):

Production Cost ◽

Wholesale Price ◽

Production Costs ◽

Investment Efficiency ◽

Price Discount ◽

Technology Investment ◽

Potential Market ◽

Cooperation Strategy ◽

Improve Production Technology ◽

Technology Investments

Abstract Cooperation between upstream suppliers and downstream manufacturers in technology investment is a popular way to improve production technology for reducing suppliers' production costs of key components. Technology investments undertaken by manufacturers and wholesale price discount contract provided by suppliers have an important impact on their cooperation. This paper explores whether a supplier should cooperate with two downstream competing manufacturers to accept their technology investments to reduce the supplier's production cost of a key component. Specifically, we consider the following three cooperation strategies: the supplier does not accept manufacturers' technology investments, only accepts one manufacturer's technology investment and accepts both manufacturers' technology investments. Our results demonstrate that the wholesale price discount contract and the technology investment can enhance the profits of the supplier and two manufacturers when the discount degree is low. Further, we conclude that when the discount degree is relatively low or when the discount degree and the technology investment efficiency are relatively high, the supplier's optimal cooperation strategy with two manufacturers is to accept both manufacturers' technology investments for reducing the supplier's production cost of the key component and both manufacturers are also willing to invest simultaneously. At last, we extend the model to the asymmetric potential market size and show that our theoretical results are robust.

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The role of retailer's app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures

RAIRO - Operations Research ◽

10.1051/ro/2020021 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Musen Xue

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Wholesale Price ◽

Power Structure ◽

Theoretic Approach ◽

Power Structures ◽

Pareto Improvement ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Quality Decision ◽

Game Theoretic Approach

The role of retailer's ability to add app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures is investigated in this paper. Applying a game-theoretic approach, we find that, first, under certain conditions, retailer's ability to add app channel can induce the manufacturer to adjust the wholesale price and product quality in the opposite direction with the manufacturer being the leader. Second, for the manufacturer and the retailer, retailer's ability to add app channel can result in two distinct profit situations regardless of the power structure of supply chain: win-win and lose-win. Moreover, in a retailer-led supply chain, adding app channel will make the whole supply chain better off when the return cost is relatively low or high, while make the whole supply chain worse off when the return cost is moderate. Third, we identify a region of the return cost under which the manufacturer, the retailer, the supply chain and consumers can gain from adding app channel, leading to a Pareto improvement.

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